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**Terrorism is constructed through speech – invoking this threat is counterproductive**

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As explained earlier, a ﬁrst order or immanent critique employs the same modes of analysis and categories to criticise the discourse on its own terms and expose the events and perspectives that the discourse fails to acknowledge or address. From this perspective, and employing the same social scientiﬁc modes of analysis, terminology, and empirical and analytical categories employed within terrorism studies, as well as many of its own texts and authors, it can be argued that virtually all the narratives and assumptions described in the previous section are contestable and subject to doubt. There is not the space here to provide counterevidence or arguments to all the assumptions and narratives of the wider discourse; I have provided more detailed counter-evidence to many of them elsewhere (see Jackson, 2008a, 2008b, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c). It must instead sufﬁce to discuss a few points which illustrate how unstable and contested this widely accepted ‘knowledge’ is. The following discussion therefore focuses on a limited number of core narratives, such as the terrorism threat, ‘new terrorism’, and counterterrorism narratives. In the ﬁrst instance, the conceptual practices which construct terrorism exclusively as a form of non-state violence are highly contestable. Given that terrorism is a violent tactic in the same way that ambushes are a tactic, it makes little sense to argue that some actors (such as states) are precluded from employing the tactic of terrorism (or ambushes). A bomb planted in a public place where civilians are likely to be randomly killed and that is aimed at causing widespread terror in an audience is an act of terrorism regardless of whether it is enacted by non-state actors or by agents acting on behalf of the state (see Jackson, 2008a). It can therefore be argued that if terrorism refers to violence directed towards or threatened against civilians which is designed to instill terror or intimidate a population for political reasons – a relatively uncontroversial deﬁnition within the ﬁeld and wider society – then states can also commit acts of terrorism. Furthermore, as I and many others have documented elsewhere (for a summary, see Jackson, 2008b), states have killed, tortured, and terrorised on a truly vast scale over the past few decades, and a great many continue to do so today in places like Colombia, Zimbabwe, Darfur, Myanmar, Palestine, Chechnya, Iraq and elsewhere. Moreover, the deliberate and systematic use of political terror by Western democratic states during the colonial period, in the ‘terror bombing’ of World War II and other air campaigns, during cold war counter-insurgency and proinsurgency campaigns, through the sponsorship of right-wing terrorist groups and during certain counterterrorism campaigns, among others, is extremely well documented (see, among many others, Gareau, 2004; Grey, 2006; Grosscup, 2006; Sluka, 2000a; Blakeley, 2006, forthcoming; Blum, 1995; Chomsky, 1985; Gabelnick et al., 1999; Herman, 1982; Human Rights Watch, 2001, 2002; Klare, 1989; Minter, 1994; Stokes, 2005, 2006; McSherry, 2002). The assumption that terrorism can be objectively deﬁned and studied is also highly questionable and far more complex than this. It can be argued that terrorism is not a causally coherent, free-standing phenomenon which can be identiﬁed in terms of characteristics inherent to the violence itself (see Jackson, 2008a). In the ﬁrst instance, ‘the nature of terrorism is not inherent in the violent act itself. One and the same act . . . can be terrorist or not, depending on intention and circumstance’ (Schmid and Jongman, 1988: 101) – and depending on who is describing the act. The killing of civilians, for example, is not always or inherently a terrorist act; it could perhaps be the unintentional consequence of a military operation during war. Terrorism is therefore a social fact rather than a brute fact, and like ‘security’, it is constructed through speech-acts by socially authorised speakers. That is, ‘terrorism’ is constituted by and through an identiﬁable set of discursive practices – such as the categorisation and collection of data by academics and security ofﬁcials, and the codiﬁcation of certain actions in law – which thus make it a contingent ‘reality’ for politicians, law enforcement ofﬁcials, the media, the public, academics, and so on. In fact, the current discourse of terrorism used by scholars, politicians and the media is a very recent invention. Before the late 1960s, there was virtually no ‘terrorism’ spoken of by politicians, the media, or academics; instead, acts of political violence were described simply as ‘bombings’, ‘kidnappings’, ‘assassinations’, ‘hijackings’, and the like (see Zulaika and Douglass, 1996). In an important sense then, terrorism does not exist outside of the deﬁnitions and practices which seek to enclose it, including those of the terrorism studies ﬁeld. Second, an increasing number of studies suggest that the threat of terrorism to Western or international security is vastly over-exaggerated (see Jackson, 2007c; Mueller, 2006). Related to this, a number of scholars have convincingly argued that the likelihood of terrorists deploying weapons of mass destruction is in fact, miniscule (B. Jenkins, 1998), as is the likelihood that so-called rogue states would provide WMD to terrorists. A number of recent studies have also seriously questioned the notion of ‘new terrorism’, demonstrating empirically and through reasoned argument that the continuities between ‘new’ and ‘old’ terrorism are much greater than any differences. In particular, they show how the assertion that the ‘new terrorism’ is primarily motivated by religious concerns is largely unsupported by the evidence (Copeland, 2001; Duyvesteyn, 2004), as is the assertion that ‘new terrorists’ are less constrained in their targeting of civilians. Third, considering the key narratives about the origins and causes of terrorism, studies by psychologists reveal that there is little if any evidence of a ‘terrorist personality’ or any discernable psychopathology among individuals involved in terrorism (Horgan, 2005; Silke, 1998). Nor is there any real evidence that suicide bombers are primarily driven by sexual frustration or that they are ‘brainwashed’ or ‘radicalised’ in mosques or on the internet (see Sageman, 2004). More importantly, a number of major empirical studies have thrown doubt on the broader assertion of a direct causal link between religion and terrorism and, speciﬁcally, the link between Islam and terrorism. The Chicago Project on Suicide Terrorism for example, which compiled a database on every case of suicide terrorism from 1980 to 2003, some 315 attacks in all, concluded that ‘there is little connection between suicide terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism, or any one of the world’s religions’ (Pape, 2005: 4). Some of the key ﬁndings of the study include: only about half of the suicide attacks from this period can be associated by group or individual characteristics with Islamic fundamentalism; the leading practitioners of suicide terrorism are the secular, Marxist-Leninist Tamil Tigers, who committed seventy-six attacks; of the 384 individual attackers on which data could be found, only 166, or 43 per cent, were religious; and 95 per cent of suicide attacks can be shown to be part of a broader political and military campaign which has a secular and strategic goal, namely, to end what is perceived as foreign occupation (Pape, 2005: 4, 17, 139, 210). Robert Pape’s ﬁndings are supported by other studies which throw doubt on the purported religion-terrorism link (see Bloom, 2005; Sageman, 2004; Holmes, 2005). Lastly, there are a number of important studies which suggest that force-based approaches to counterterrorism are not only ineffective and counterproductive, but can also be damaging to individuals, communities, and human rights (see Hillyard, 1993; Cole, 2003). Certainly, there are powerful arguments to be made against the use of torture in counterterrorism (Brecher, 2007; Scarry, 2004; Jackson, 2007d), and a growing number of studies which are highly critical of the efﬁcacy and wider consequences of the war on terrorism (see, among many others, Rogers, 2007; Cole, 2007; Lustick, 2006). In sum, much of what is accepted as unproblematic ‘knowledge’ in terrorism studies is actually of dubious provenance. In a major review of the ﬁeld, Andrew Silke has described it as ‘a cabal of virulent myths and half-truths whose reach extends even to the most learned and experienced’ (Silke, 2004b: 20). However, the purpose of the ﬁrst order critique I have undertaken here is not necessarily to establish the real and ﬁnal ‘truth’ about terrorism. Rather, ﬁrst order critique aims simply to destabilise dominant understandings and accepted knowledge, expose the biases and imbalances in the ﬁeld, and suggest that other ways of understanding, conceptualising, and studying the subject – other ways of ‘knowing’ – are possible. This kind of critical destabilisation is useful for opening up the space needed to ask new kinds of analytical and normative questions and to pursue alternative intellectual and political projects.

**This securitizing logic manifests itself in a drive for certainty which causes endless violence**

**Burke, 7** (Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of New South Wales at Sydney, Anthony, Johns Hopkins University Press, Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason, Project Muse)

This essay develops a theory about the causes of war -- and thus aims to generate lines of action and critique for peace -- that cuts beneath analyses based either on a given sequence of events, threats, insecurities and political manipulation, or the play of institutional, economic or political interests (the 'military-industrial complex'). Such factors are important to be sure, and should not be discounted, but they flow over a deeper bedrock of modern reason that has not only come to form a powerful structure of common sense but the apparently solid ground of the real itself. In this light, the two 'existential' and 'rationalist' discourses of war-making and justification mobilised in the Lebanon war are more than merely arguments, rhetorics or even discourses. Certainly they mobilise forms of knowledge and power together; providing political leaderships, media, citizens, bureaucracies and military forces with organising systems of belief, action, analysis and rationale. But they run deeper than that. They are truth-systems of the most powerful and fundamental kind that we have in modernity: ontologies, statements about truth and being which claim a rarefied privilege to state what is and how it must be maintained as it is. I am thinking of ontology in both its senses: ontology as both a statement about the nature and ideality of being (in this case political being, that of the nation-state), and as a statement of epistemological truth and certainty, of methods and processes of arriving at certainty (in this case, the development and application of strategic knowledge for the use of armed force, and the creation and maintenance of geopolitical order, security and national survival). These derive from the classical idea of ontology as a speculative or positivistic inquiry into the fundamental nature of truth, of being, or of some phenomenon; the desire for a solid metaphysical account of things inaugurated by Aristotle, an account of 'being qua being and its essential attributes'.17 In contrast, drawing on Foucauldian theorising about truth and power, I see ontology as a particularly powerful claim to truth itself: a claim to the status of an underlying systemic foundation for truth, identity, existence and action; one that is not essential or timeless, but is thoroughly historical and contingent, that is deployed and mobilised in a fraught and conflictual socio-political context of some kind. In short, ontology is the 'politics of truth'18 in its most sweeping and powerful form. I see such a drive for ontological certainty and completion as particularly problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly, when it takes the form of the existential and rationalist ontologies of war, it amounts to a hard and exclusivist claim: a drive for ideational hegemony and closure that limits debate and questioning, that confines it within the boundaries of a particular, closed system of logic, one that is grounded in the truth of being, in the truth of truth as such. The second is its intimate relation with violence: the dual ontologies represent a simultaneously social and conceptual structure that generates violence. Here we are witness to an epistemology of violence (strategy) joined to an ontology of violence (the national security state). When we consider their relation to war, the two ontologies are especially dangerous because each alone (and doubly in combination) tends both to quicken the resort to war and to lead to its escalation either in scale and duration, or in unintended effects. In such a context violence is not so much a tool that can be picked up and used on occasion, at limited cost and with limited impact -- it permeates being. This essay describes firstly the ontology of the national security state (by way of the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, Carl Schmitt and G. W. F. Hegel) and secondly the rationalist ontology of strategy (by way of the geopolitical thought of Henry Kissinger), showing how they crystallise into a mutually reinforcing system of support and justification, especially in the thought of Clausewitz. This creates both a profound ethical and pragmatic problem. The ethical problem arises because of their militaristic force -- they embody and reinforce a norm of war -- and because they enact what Martin Heidegger calls an 'enframing' image of technology and being in which humans are merely utilitarian instruments for use, control and destruction, and force -- in the words of one famous Cold War strategist -- can be thought of as a 'power to hurt'.19 The pragmatic problem arises because force so often produces neither the linear system of effects imagined in strategic theory nor anything we could meaningfully call security, but rather turns in upon itself in a nihilistic spiral of pain and destruction. In the era of a 'war on terror' dominantly conceived in Schmittian and Clausewitzian terms,20 the arguments of Hannah Arendt (that violence collapses ends into means) and Emmanuel Levinas (that 'every war employs arms that turn against those that wield them') take on added significance. Neither, however, explored what occurs when war and being are made to coincide, other than Levinas' intriguing comment that in war persons 'play roles in which they no longer recognises themselves, making them betray not only commitments but their own substance'. 21 What I am trying to describe in this essay is a complex relation between, and interweaving of, epistemology and ontology. But it is not my view that these are distinct modes of knowledge or levels of truth, because in the social field named by security, statecraft and violence they are made to blur together, continually referring back on each other, like charges darting between electrodes. Rather they are related systems of knowledge with particular systemic roles and intensities of claim about truth, political being and political necessity. Positivistic or scientific claims to epistemological truth supply an air of predictability and reliability to policy and political action, which in turn support larger ontological claims to national being and purpose, drawing them into a common horizon of certainty that is one of the central features of past-Cartesian modernity. Here it may be useful to see ontology as a more totalising and metaphysical set of claims about truth, and epistemology as more pragmatic and instrumental; but while a distinction between epistemology (knowledge as technique) and ontology (knowledge as being) has analytical value, it tends to break down in action**.** The epistemology of violence I describe here (strategic science and foreign policy doctrine) claims positivistic clarity about techniques of military and geopolitical action which use force and coercion to achieve a desired end, an end that is supplied by the ontological claim to national existence, security, or order. However in practice, technique quickly passes into ontology. This it does in two ways. First, instrumental violence is married to an ontology of insecure national existence which itself admits no questioning. The nation and its identity are known and essential, prior to any conflict, and the resort to violence becomes an equally essential predicate of its perpetuation. In this way knowledge-as-strategy claims, in a positivistic fashion, to achieve a calculability of effects (power) for an ultimate purpose (securing being) that it must always assume. Second, strategy as a technique not merely becomes an instrument of state power but ontologises itself in a technological image of 'man' as a maker and user of things, including other humans, which have no essence or integrity outside their value as objects. In Heidegger's terms, technology becomes being; epistemology immediately becomes technique, immediately being. This combination could be seen in the aftermath of the 2006 Lebanon war, whose obvious strategic failure for Israelis generated fierce attacks on the army and political leadership and forced the resignation of the IDF chief of staff. Yet in its wake neither ontology was rethought. Consider how a reserve soldier, while on brigade-sized manoeuvres in the Golan Heights in early 2007, was quoted as saying: 'we are ready for the next war'. Uri Avnery quoted Israeli commentators explaining the rationale for such a war as being to 'eradicate the shame and restore to the army the "deterrent power" that was lost on the battlefields of that unfortunate war'. In 'Israeli public discourse', he remarked, 'the next war is seen as a natural phenomenon, like tomorrow's sunrise.' The danger obviously raised here is that these dual ontologies of war link being, means, events and decisions into a single, unbroken chain whose very process of construction cannot be examined. As is clear in the work of Carl Schmitt, being implies action, the action that is war. This chain is also obviously at work in the U.S. neoconservative doctrine that argues, as Bush did in his 2002 West Point speech, that 'the only path to safety is the path of action', which begs the question of whether strategic practice and theory can be detached from strong ontologies of the insecure nation-state. This is the direction taken by much realist analysis critical of Israel and the Bush administration's 'war on terror' Reframing such concerns in Foucauldian terms, we could argue that obsessive ontological commitments have led to especially disturbing 'problematizations' of truth. However such rationalist critiques rely on a one-sided interpretation of Clausewitz that seeks to disentangle strategic from existential reason, and to open up choice in that way. However without interrogating more deeply how they form a conceptual harmony in Clausewitz's thought -- and thus in our dominant understandings of politics and war -- tragically violent 'choices' will continue to be made The essay concludes by pondering a normative problem that arises out of its analysis: if the divisive ontology of the national security state and the violent and instrumental vision of 'enframing' have, as Heidegger suggests, come to define being and drive 'out every other possibility of revealing being', how can they be escaped? How can other choices and alternatives be found and enacted? How is there any scope for agency and resistance in the face of them? Their social and discursive power -- one that aims to take up the entire space of the political -- needs to be respected and understood. However, we are far from powerless in the face of them. The need is to critique dominant images of political being and dominant ways of securing that being at the same time, and to act and choose such that we bring into the world a more sustainable, peaceful and non-violent global rule of the political.

**The alternative is to deterritorialize the 1AC through a historical and critical lens – rather than objectively approaching their threat discourse, we choose more diverse forms of analysis**

**Krause and Williams 97** (Keith Krause, professor of political science at the Graduate Institute on International and Development Studies, Michael C Williams, professor of international relations at the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, “From Strategy to Security: Foundations of Critical Security Studies,” chapter 2 of Critical Security Studies, p 49-50)

The challenges to the conventional understanding of security and the object to be secured also necessitate an epistemological shift in the way security is to be understood and studied. What is involved is a shift in focus from abstract individualism and contractual sovereignty to a stress on culture, civilization, and identity; the role of ideas, norms, and values in the constitution of that which is to be secured; and the historical context within which this process takes place. Epistemologically, this involves moving away from the objectivist, rationalist approach of both neorealism and neoliberalism, and toward more interpretive modes of analysis. While these issues have gained some prominence in debates over the nature of regime theory and the study of international organizations, they have made little impact on security studies.51 This is clearly illustrated by Helga Haftendorn’s attempts to broaden the ambit of security studies. On method, she concludes that the goal of security studies is “to construct an empirically testable paradigm,” which involves defining the “set of observational hypotheses,” the “hard core of irrefutable assumptions,” and the “‘set of scope conditions’ that…are required for a ‘progressive’ research program.” Although she admits that “we might do well to follow [Robert] Keohane’s counsel to apply somewhat ‘softer,’ more interpretive standards,” there is little room in this approach for studying norm change and the role of ideational elements in *constituting* the historical context within which actors take specific decisions.52 Despite Haftendorn’s goal of incorporating new issues that are normatively driven, the subordination of normative and reflexive conceptions of agency to objectivist visions of method remains largely undisturbed, and she remains committed to the fact value distinction. To understand security from a broader perspective means to look at the ways in which the objects to be secured, the perceptions of threats to them, and the available means of securing them (both intellectual and material) have shifted over time.53 New threats emerge; new enemies are created; erstwhile fellow citizens become objects of hatred and violence; former enemies can be transformed into members of the same community. The status of Others is uncertain, needing to be deciphered and determined.54 To comprehend these processes requires an understanding of the problematics of security as constituted by self-reflexive historical practices. The knightly code of honor, for example, was both a central structuring practice of latemedieval conflict and a central object that was to be secured. Honor was an integral part of conflict in its genesis as well as its practice. To view the military conflict of the late-medieval world as a competition between instrumentally rational actors in the modern sense is to misunderstand it in both form and content.55 The shift to interpretive models of understanding (broadly conceived) also yields a different vision of the transformation of practices. As historically grounded, the practices of security become capable of conscious transformation through the process of critical reflection. No longer objective in the sense of a fixed reality that the analyst can only mirror, reality as the realm of subjective practices and structures becomes self-reflexive. This is most emphatically not to say that security studies needs to move away from studying the role of ideas, institutions, and instruments of organized violence in political life. In this respect, the continuing defenders of traditional strategic/security studies are correct (although this formulation will probably leave them uncomfortable). But if we are to understand these realities, we must take them more seriously than the abstractions of neorealism allow. We must grasp the genesis and structure of particular security problems as grounded in concrete historical conditions and practices, rather than in abstract assertions of transcendental rational actors and scientific methods. We must understand the genesis of conflicts and the creation of the dilemmas of security as grounded in reflexive practices rather than as the outcome of timeless structures.56

**Only a discursive focus ruptures dominant power relations**

**Bruce and Cheeseman 96** (Robert, Associate Professor in Social Science – Curtin University and Graeme Cheeseman, Senior Lecturer – University of New South Wales, Discourses of Danger and Dread Frontiers, p. 5-9)

This goal is pursued in ways which are still unconventional in the intellectual milieu of international relations in Australia, even though they are gaining influence worldwide as traditional modes of theory and practice are rendered inadequate by global trends that defy comprehension, let alone policy. The inability to give meaning to global changes reflects partly the enclosed, elitist world of professional security analysts and bureaucratic experts, where entry is gained by learning and accepting to speak a particular, exclusionary language. The contributors to this book are familiar with the discourse, but accord no privileged place to its ‘knowledge form as reality’ in debates on defence and security. Indeed, they believe that **debate will be furthered only through a** long overdue **critical re-evaluation** of elite perspectives. Pluralistic, democratically-oriented perspectives on Australia’s identity are both required and essential if Australia’s thinking on defence and security is to be invigorated. This is not a conventional policy book; **nor should it be**, in the sense of offering policy-makers and their academic counterparts sets of neat alternative solutions, **in familiar language and format**, to problems they pose. **This expectation is in itself a considerable part of the problem** to be analysed. It is, however, a book about policy, one that questions **how problems are framed** by policy-makers. It challenges the proposition that irreducible bodies of real knowledge on defence and security exist independently of their ‘context in the world’, and it demonstrates how security policy is articulated authoritatively by the elite keepers of that knowledge, experts trained to recognize enduring, universal wisdom. All others, from this perspective, must accept such wisdom or remain outside the expert domain, tainted by their inability to comply with the ‘rightness’ of the official line. But it is precisely the official line, or at least its image of the world, that needs to be problematised. If the critic responds directly to the demand for policy alternatives, without addressing this image, he or she is tacitly endorsing it. **Before engaging in the policy debate the critics need to reframe the basic terms of reference**. This book, then, reflects and underlines the importance of Antonio Gramsci and Edward Said’s ‘critical intellectuals’.15 The demand, tacit or otherwise, that the policy-maker’s frame of reference be accepted as the only basis for discussion and analysis ignores a **three thousand year old tradition** commonly associated with Socrates and purportedly **integral** to the Western tradition of democraticdialogue. More immediately, it ignores post-seventeenth century democratic traditions which insist that a good society must have within it some way of critically assessing its knowledge and the decisions based upon that knowledge which impact upon citizens of such a society. This is a tradition with a slightly different connotation in contemporary liberal democracies which, during the Cold War, were proclaimed different and superior to the totalitarian enemy precisely because there were institutional checks and balances upon power. In short, one of the major differences between ‘open societies’ and their (closed) counterparts behind the Iron Curtain was that the former encouraged the critical testing of the knowledge and decisions of the powerful and assessing them against liberal democratic principles. The latter tolerated criticism only on rare and limited occasions. For some, this represented the triumph of rational-scientific methods of inquiry and techniques of falsification. For others, especially since positivism and rationalism have lost much of their allure, it meant that for society to become open and liberal, sectors of the population must be independent of the state and free to question its knowledge and power. Though we do not expect this position to be accepted by every reader, contributors to this book believe that critical dialogue is long overdue in Australia and needs to be listened to. For all its liberal democratic trappings, Australia’s security community continues to invoke closed monological narratives on defence and security. This book also questions the distinctions between policy practice and academic theory that inform conventional accounts of Australian security. One of its major concerns, particularly in chapters 1 and 2, is to illustrate how theory is **integral** to the practice of security analysis and policy prescription. The book also calls on policy-makers, academics and students of defence and security to think critically about what they are reading, writing and saying; to begin to ask, of their work and study, difficult and searching questions raised in other disciplines; to recognise, no matter how uncomfortable it feels, that what is involved in theory and practice is not the ability to identify a replacement for failed models, but a realisation that terms and concepts – state sovereignty, balance of power, security, and so on – are contested and problematic, and that the world is indeterminate, always becoming what is written about it. Critical analysis which shows how particular kinds of theoretical presumptions can effectively **exclude vital areas of political life** from analysis has **direct practical implications** for policy-makers, academics and citizens who face the daunting task of steering Australia through some potentially choppy international waters over the next few years. There is also much of interest in the chapters for those struggling to give meaning to a world where so much that has long been taken for granted now demands imaginative, incisive reappraisal. The contributors, too, have struggled to find meaning, often despairing at the terrible human costs of international violence. This is why readers will find no single, fully formed panacea for the world’s ills in general, or Australia’s security in particular. There are none. Every chapter, however, in its own way, offers something more than is found in orthodox literature, often by exposing ritualistic Cold War defence and security mind-sets that are dressed up as new thinking. Chapters 7 and 9, for example, present alternative ways of engaging in security and defence practice. Others (chapters 3, 4, 5, 6 and 8) seek to alert policy-makers, academics and students to alternative theoretical possibilities which might better serve an Australian community pursuing security and prosperity in an uncertain world. All chapters confront the policy community and its counterparts in the academy with a deep awareness of the intellectual and material constraints imposed by dominant traditions of realism, but they avoid dismissive and exclusionary terms which often in the past characterized exchanges between policy-makers and their critics. This is because, as noted earlier, attention needs to be paid to the words and the thought processes of those being criticized. A close reading of this kind draws attention to underlying assumptions, showing they need to be recognized and questioned. A sense of doubt (in place of confident certainty) is a **necessary prelude** to a genuine search for alternative policies. **First** comes an awareness of the need for new perspectives, **then** specific policies may follow. As Jim George argues in the following chapter, **we need to look not so much at contending policies** as they are made for us but at **challenging ‘the discursive process** which gives [favoured interpretations of “reality”] their meaning and which direct [Australia’s] policy/analytical/military responses’. This process is not restricted to the small, official defence and security establishment huddled around the US-Australian War Memorial in Canberra. It also encompasses much of Australia’s academic defence and security community located primarily though not exclusively within the Australian National University and the University College of the University of New South Wales. These discursive processes are examined in detail in subsequent chapters as authors attempt to make sense of a politics of exclusion and closure which exercises disciplinary power over Australia’s security community. They also question the discourse of ‘regional security’, ‘security cooperation’, ‘peacekeeping’ and ‘alliance politics’ that are central to Australia’s official and academic security agenda in the 1990s. This is seen as an important task especially when, as is revealed, the disciplines of International Relations and Strategic Studies are under challenge from critical and theoretical debates ranging across the social sciences and humanities; debates that are nowhere to be found in Australian defence and security studies. The chapters graphically illustrate how Australia’s public policies on defence and security are informed, underpinned and legitimised by a narrowly-based intellectual enterprise which draws strength from contested concepts of realism and liberalism, which in turn seek legitimacy through policy-making processes. Contributors ask whether Australia’s policy-makers and their academic advisors are unaware of broader intellectual debates, or resistant to them, or choose not to understand them, and why?

**Every affirmation is fundamentally a decision and an affirmation of a particular interpretation of what it means to decide – their attempt to elevate their particular method of decision to the status of metaphysics links to all of our offense and begs the question of their justification for exclusion**

**Dillon 99** (Michael Dillon, professor of international relations at the University of Lancaster, PhD in philosophy, April 1999, “Another Justice,” published in Political Theory Volume 27 Number 2, page 157-8)

I wish to argue, in addition, that the condition of being-in-between is exemplified by the 'inter' of another international relations. Especially in the proximity of the Refugee, for example, there is an explicit manifestation of the advent of the claim of Justice. The traditional intersubjectivity of international relations defaults, through the way in which the advent of the Refugee always calls to presence the stranger in the self itself, into the intra of a plural and divided self. The figure of the sovereign subject so integral to traditional international thought falsely poses the key questions of the self, of origination and of Justice. There can be no sovereign point of departure. The law is always born from a broken law, justice from the absence of Justice. There is always a co-presence of the other in the same; such that every self is a hybrid. The origin, if it is to issue forth in anything, therefore, must always already come divided and incomplete. The advent of Justice and the possibility of politics arise only because that plethos is ineradicable. There is then no sovereign subject. The self is a divided self from a beginning that is itself incomplete. It is only by virtue of that very division, that very incompleteness, that the question of justice arises at all. Thought of another Justice is therefore a continuous displacement of normal justice, a radical discomfort to it. But I have first to note how normal justice understands its place before considering the taking place of Justice differently. At its simplest the normal model of justice-sometimes known as the distributive model-notes that any society is governed by rules.9 Normal models differ, however, according to how they account for the derivation of those rules, what those rules define as just and unjust, and who or what is empowered by them to make, execute, and interpret the law. The most basic of these rules establish the status and entitlements of those who belong to the community. Correspondingly, these rules also specify who is a stranger, outsider, or alien, and they sometimes make provision for how the alien is to be dealt with should she or he appear at, or cross, the threshold of the community. This, in its crudest terms, is distributive justice. The laws, which it specifies, establish a regime of justice that expresses the ethical beliefs and commitments of that community. More than that, they inaugurate them. Each juridical decision is in some way, great or small, a communal rededication of those beliefs. The law, then, does not merely make a decision or enact a will. It reinaugurates a sense of what it is to have a will and make a decision in that community, as well as to what ends and purposes these may be devoted.10 Such law has to come from somewhere. An official narrative of one form or another supports how the community came to have the law which it does, together with the means and manner by which it is to be interpreted and exercised. That narrative explains both the origins of the law and the way in which it has been handed down. God and covenants, immemorial traditions and social contracts are amongst the most favoured of these. Divine inspiration, the dictates of reason, or a common sense are then said to furnish the law with the secure foundation it is thought to require. Injustice for the normal model, it further follows, is a function of sin, or the breakdown of reason, or the failure to attend to the dictates of common sense. One way or another, each of these ruptures tends to be blamed upon the irruption of irregular passions and desires which the law was inaugurated to limit and control as the means of determining and dispensing justice in the first place. Injustice for the normal model, in short, is the abnormal which effects a breach in the very paternity of the law itself. It is what the normal model claims to keep at bay as distributive justice orders the affairs of the community. All thought of justice and politics must, of course, pass through thought. How could it be otherwise? We think justice in the way that we do because of the various forms through which it is established and distributed. We also think justice in the way that we do because of the way that we think. The thought of another Justice is necessarily dependent therefore upon a way of thinking other than that which has historically come to govern our diverse onto-theological traditions of justice. That other way of thinking has continuously to be contrasted with the thought that underlies distributive justice, so that the characteristic features of another Justice may be differentiated from those of the normal model. Two of the key points of difference concern the interpretation of Time and the interpretation of the Human. Each of these derives from what I call the return of the ontological in continental thought.

**Off**

A. Interpretation – engagement is a strategy depending on positive incentives which seeks to shape the behavior of a target country

**Haass & O’Sullivan, 2000** – \*Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution AND \*Fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution, (Richard N & Meghan L., “Terms of engagement: alternatives to punitive policies,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, Vol. 42, No. 2, Summer 2000, pp. 113–35, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1093/survival/42.2.113#preview)

The term ‘engagement’ was popularised in the early 1980s amid controversy about the Reagan administration’s policy of ‘constructive engagement’ towards South Africa. However, the term itself remains a source of confusion. Except in the few instances where the US has sought to isolate a regime or country, America arguably ‘engages’ states and actors all the time simply by interacting with them. To be a meaningful subject of analysis, the term ‘engagement’ must refer to something more specific than a policy of ‘non-isolation’. As used in this article, ‘engagement’ refers to a foreign-policy strategy which depends to a significant degree on positive incentives to achieve its objectives. Certainly, it does not preclude the simultaneous use of other foreign-policy instruments such as sanctions or military force: in practice, there is often considerable overlap of strategies, particularly when the termination or lifting of sanctions is used as a positive inducement. Yet the distinguishing feature of American engagement strategies is their reliance on the extension or provision of incentives to shape the behaviour of countries with which the US has important disagreements.

That means the plan must be a quid-pro-quo

**De LaHunt, 6** – Assistant Director for Environmental Health & Safety Services in Colorado College's Facilities Services department (John, “Perverse and unintended” Journal of Chemical Health and Safety, July-August, Science Direct)

Incentives work on a quid pro quo basis – this for that. If you change your behavior, I’ll give you a reward. One could say that coercion is an incentive program – do as I say and I’ll let you live. However, I define an incentive as getting something you didn’t have before in exchange for new behavior, so that pretty much puts coercion in its own box, one separate from incentives. But fundamental problems plague the incentive approach. Like coercion, incentives are poor motivators in the long run, for at least two reasons – unintended consequences and perverse incentives.

**Terror**

**Yemen’s ruining AQAP**

**Ghosh 12** (Bobby Ghosh, deputy international editor for TIME World, 9-6-12, “How Yemen May Defeat Al-Qaeda,” http://world.time.com/2012/09/06/how-yemen-may-defeat-al-qaeda/) GZ

Could tiny, impoverished Yemen be showing the way to vanquish al-Qaeda? That’s the subject of my latest article in the current issue of TIME magazine. This summer, unnoticed by most of the world, Yemeni troops reclaimed territory that for over a year had been controlled by the terrorist network’s local franchise, known as al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsila (AQAP). The fighting was intense and bloody, but in the end the jihadists were soundly beaten. Many were killed, and those who fled are now finding it much harder than before to find shelter among tribesmen in the more remote parts of the country. The U.S. can claim — but is being careful not to — some of the credit, since American drones played a part in the battle. But the boots on the ground were Yemeni, and it was they who did most of the hard fighting. In meaningful ways, this was a victory for the Arab Spring: the uprising removed Ali Abdallah Saleh, Yemen’s longstanding dictator, from office, and his elected replacement, President Hadi, has made defeating AQAP a high priority. It helped, too, that a national consensus had evolved about the danger AQAP presents to Yemen. Only a couple of years ago, many Yemenis thought the jihadists were America’s problem, not their own. But when AQAP seized a swath of territory in the southern province of Abyan, that delusion could no longer be sustained. Ruling much like Afghanistan’s Taliban, AQAP imposed a harsh interpretation of Islamic law on towns like Zinjibar and Jaar: the population responded by fleeing. Tens of thousands flocked to the port city of Aden, where their presence undermined the jihadists claim to being a popular movement.

**Their leadership’s fading fast**

**Almasmari 1/26** (Hakim Almasmari, “Yemen’s Militants Lose a Key Figure,” <http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/yemens-militants-lose-a-key-figure>) gz

Yemeni militants have suffered a major setback as the government confirmed yesterday that Al Qaeda's number two in the region had died of wounds sustained in a drone attack last year. Saeed Al Shahri, a Saudi national and the deputy emir of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Penisula (AQAP), was injured in an air strike in the city of Saada last year and was said to have been in a coma since. It was not clear when he died. Yemeni security officials said Al Shahri was a key figure in the rise of AQAP and was behind at least a dozen suicide bombings and assassination attempts in Yemen over the past five years. The government claimed Al Shahri's death as a success in its fight against terrorism, which has destabilised the fragile transitional government of Abdurabu Mansur Hadi, who succeeded Ali Abdullah Saleh as president last year. "President Hadi gave Al Qaeda numerous options, even dialogue, but they refused and this is when he was insistent to use an iron fist against them," a senior presidential aide said. "His successes over the past year against Al Qaeda equal the successes of his former of an entire decade." Mohammed Al Ghobari, an Al Qaeda expert at the Abaad Strategic Centre in Sanaa, said that AQAP had been weakened. "Al Shahri's death is a clear defeat to Al Qaeda, whether on the ground, emotional, or spiritual," said Mr. "His death means that Al Qaeda is now on the run and witnessing defeat."

**No scenario for nuclear terror---consensus of experts**

Matt **Fay 13**, PhD student in the history department at Temple University, has a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science from St. Xavier University and a Master’s in International Relations and Conflict Resolution with a minor in Transnational Security Studies from American Military University, 7/18/13, “The Ever-Shrinking Odds of Nuclear Terrorism”, webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:HoItCUNhbgUJ:hegemonicobsessions.com/%3Fp%3D902+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us&client=firefox-a

For over a decade now, one of the most oft-repeated threats raised by policymakers—the one that in many ways justified the invasion of Iraq—has been that of nuclear terrorism. Officials in both the Bush and Obama administrations, including the presidents themselves, have raised the specter of the atomic terrorist. But **beyond mere rhetoric, how likely is a nuclear terrorist attack** really?¶ While pessimistic estimates about America’s ability to avoid a nuclear terrorist attack became something of a cottage industry following the September 11th attacks, a number of scholars in recent years have pushed back against this trend. Frank Gavin has put post-9/11 fears of nuclear terrorism into historical context (pdf) and **argued against the prevailing alarmism**. Anne Stenersen of the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment has challenged the idea that al Qaeda was ever bound and determined to acquire a nuclear weapon. John **Mueller ridiculed the notion of nuclear terrorism** in his book Atomic Obsessions and highlighted the numerous steps a terrorist group would need to take—all of which would have to be successful—in order to procure, deliver, and detonate an atomic weapon. And in his excellent, and exceedingly even-handed, treatment of the subject, On Nuclear Terrorism, Michael Levi outlined the difficulties terrorists would face building their own nuclear weapon and discussed how a “system of systems” could be developed to interdict potential materials smuggled into the United States—citing a “Murphy’s law of nuclear terrorism” that could possibly dissuade terrorists from even trying in the first place.¶ But what about the possibility that a rogue state could transfer a nuclear weapon to a terrorist group? That was ostensibly why the United States deposed Saddam Hussein’s regime: fear he would turnover one of his hypothetical nuclear weapons for al Qaeda to use.¶ Enter into this discussion Keir Lieber and Daryl Press and their article in the most recent edition of International Security, “Why States Won’t Give Nuclear Weapons to Terrorists.” Lieber and Press have been writing on nuclear issues for just shy of a decade—doing innovative, if controversial work on American nuclear strategy. However, I believe this is their first venture into the debate over nuclear terrorism. And while others, such as Mueller, have argued that states are unlikely to transfer nuclear weapons to terrorists, this article is the first to tackle the subject with an empirical analysis.¶ The title of their article nicely sums up their argument: **states will not turn over nuclear weapons terrorists**. To back up this claim, Lieber and Press attack the idea that states will transfer nuclear weapons to terrorists because terrorists operate of absent a “return address.” Based on an examination of attribution following conventional terrorist attacks, the authors conclude:¶ [N]either a terror group nor a state sponsor would remain anonymous after a nuclear attack. We draw this conclusion on the basis of four main findings. First, data on a decade of terrorist incidents reveal a strong positive relationship between the number of fatalities caused in a terror attack and the likelihood of attribution. Roughly three-quarters of the attacks that kill 100 people or more are traced back to the perpetrators. Second, attribution rates are far higher for attacks on the U.S. homeland or the territory of a major U.S. ally—97 percent (thirty-six of thirty-seven) for incidents that killed ten or more people. Third, tracing culpability from a guilty terrorist group back to its state sponsor is not likely to be difficult: few countries sponsor terrorism; few terrorist groups have state sponsors; each sponsor terrorist group has few sponsors (typically one); and only one country that sponsors terrorism, has nuclear weapons or enough fissile material to manufacture a weapon. In sum, attribution of nuclear terror incidents would be easier than is typically suggested, and passing weapons to terrorists would not offer countries escape from the constraints of deterrence.¶ From this analysis, Lieber and Press draw two major implications for U.S. foreign policy: claims that it is impossible to attribute nuclear terrorism to particular groups or potential states sponsors undermines deterrence; and fear of states transferring nuclear weapons to terrorist groups, by itself, does not justify extreme measures to prevent nuclear proliferation.¶ This is a key point. While there are other reasons nuclear proliferation is undesirable, fears of nuclear terrorism have been used to justify a wide-range of policies—up to, and including, military action. Put in its proper perspective however—given the difficulty in constructing and transporting a nuclear device and the improbability of state transfer—**nuclear terrorism hardly warrants** the type of exertions many **alarmist assessments** indicate it should.

**No risk of nuclear terror – assumes every warrant**

**Mueller 10** (John, professor of political science at Ohio State, Calming Our Nuclear Jitters, Issues in Science and Technology, Winter, <http://www.issues.org/26.2/mueller.html>)

Politicians of all stripes preach to an anxious, appreciative, and very numerous choir when they, like President Obama, proclaim atomic terrorism to be “the most immediate and extreme threat to global security.” It is the problem that, according to Defense Secretary Robert Gates, currently keeps every senior leader awake at night. This is hardly a new anxiety. In 1946, atomic bomb maker J. Robert Oppenheimer ominously warned that if three or four men could smuggle in units for an atomic bomb, they could blow up New York. This was an early expression of a pattern of dramatic risk inflation that has persisted throughout the nuclear age. In fact, although expanding fires and fallout might increase the effective destructive radius, the blast of a Hiroshima-size device would “blow up” about 1% of the city’s area—a tragedy, of course, but not the same as one 100 times greater. In the early 1970s, nuclear physicist Theodore Taylor proclaimed the atomic terrorist problem to be “immediate,” explaining at length “how comparatively easy it would be to steal nuclear material and step by step make it into a bomb.” At the time he thought it was already too late to “prevent the making of a few bombs, here and there, now and then,” or “in another ten or fifteen years, it will be too late.” Three decades after Taylor, we continue to wait for terrorists to carry out their “easy” task. In contrast to these predictions, terrorist groups seem to have exhibited only limited desire and even less progress in going atomic. This may be because, after brief exploration of the possible routes, they, unlike generations of alarmists, have discovered that the tremendous effort required is scarcely likely to be successful. The most plausible route for terrorists, according to most experts, would be to manufacture an atomic device themselves from purloined fissile material (plutonium or, more likely, highly enriched uranium). This task, however, remains a daunting one, requiring that a considerable series of difficult hurdles be conquered and in sequence. Outright armed theft of fissile material is exceedingly unlikely not only because of the resistance of guards, but because chase would be immediate. A more promising approach would be to corrupt insiders to smuggle out the required substances. However, this requires the terrorists to pay off a host of greedy confederates, including brokers and money-transmitters, any one of whom could turn on them or, either out of guile or incompetence, furnish them with stuff that is useless. Insiders might also consider the possibility that once the heist was accomplished, the terrorists would, as analyst Brian Jenkins none too delicately puts it, “have every incentive to cover their trail, beginning with eliminating their confederates.” If terrorists were somehow successful at obtaining a sufficient mass of relevant material, they would then probably have to transport it a long distance over unfamiliar terrain and probably while being pursued by security forces. Crossing international borders would be facilitated by following established smuggling routes, but these are not as chaotic as they appear and are often under the watch of suspicious and careful criminal regulators. If border personnel became suspicious of the commodity being smuggled, some of them might find it in their interest to disrupt passage, perhaps to collect the bounteous reward money that would probably be offered by alarmed governments once the uranium theft had been discovered. Once outside the country with their precious booty, terrorists would need to set up a large and well-equipped machine shop to manufacture a bomb and then to populate it with a very select team of highly skilled scientists, technicians, machinists, and administrators. The group would have to be assembled and retained for the monumental task while no consequential suspicions were generated among friends, family, and police about their curious and sudden absence from normal pursuits back home. Members of the bomb-building team would also have to be utterly devoted to the cause, of course, and they would have to be willing to put their lives and certainly their careers at high risk, because after their bomb was discovered or exploded they would probably become the targets of an intense worldwide dragnet operation. Some observers have insisted that it would be easy for terrorists to assemble a crude bomb if they could get enough fissile material. But Christoph Wirz and Emmanuel Egger, two senior physicists in charge of nuclear issues at Switzerland‘s Spiez Laboratory, bluntly conclude that the task “could hardly be accomplished by a subnational group.” They point out that precise blueprints are required, not just sketches and general ideas, and that even with a good blueprint the terrorist group would most certainly be forced to redesign. They also stress that the work is difficult, dangerous, and extremely exacting, and that the technical requirements in several fields verge on the unfeasible. Stephen Younger, former director of nuclear weapons research at Los Alamos Laboratories, has made a similar argument, pointing out that uranium is “exceptionally difficult to machine” whereas “plutonium is one of the most complex metals ever discovered, a material whose basic properties are sensitive to exactly how it is processed.“ Stressing the “daunting problems associated with material purity, machining, and a host of other issues,” Younger concludes, “to think that a terrorist group, working in isolation with an unreliable supply of electricity and little access to tools and supplies” could fabricate a bomb “is farfetched at best.” Under the best circumstances, the process of making a bomb could take months or even a year or more, which would, of course, have to be carried out in utter secrecy. In addition, people in the area, including criminals, may observe with increasing curiosity and puzzlement the constant coming and going of technicians unlikely to be locals. If the effort to build a bomb was successful, the finished product, weighing a ton or more, would then have to be transported to and smuggled into the relevant target country where it would have to be received by collaborators who are at once totally dedicated and technically proficient at handling, maintaining, detonating, and perhaps assembling the weapon after it arrives. The financial costs of this extensive and extended operation could easily become monumental. There would be expensive equipment to buy, smuggle, and set up and people to pay or pay off. Some operatives might work for free out of utter dedication to the cause, but the vast conspiracy also requires the subversion of a considerable array of criminals and opportunists, each of whom has every incentive to push the price for cooperation as high as possible. Any criminals competent and capable enough to be effective allies are also likely to be both smart enough to see boundless opportunities for extortion and psychologically equipped by their profession to be willing to exploit them. Those who warn about the likelihood of a terrorist bomb contend that a terrorist group could, if with great difficulty, overcome each obstacle and that doing so in each case is “not impossible.” But although it may not be impossible to surmount each individual step, the likelihood that a group could surmount a series of them quickly becomes vanishingly small. Table 1 attempts to catalogue the barriers that must be overcome under the scenario considered most likely to be successful. In contemplating the task before them, would-be atomic terrorists would effectively be required to go though an exercise that looks much like this. If and when they do, they will undoubtedly conclude that their prospects are daunting and accordingly uninspiring or even terminally dispiriting. It is possible to calculate the chances for success. Adopting probability estimates that purposely and heavily bias the case in the terrorists’ favor—for example, assuming the terrorists have a 50% chance of overcoming each of the 20 obstacles—the chances that a concerted effort would be successful comes out to be less than one in a million. If one assumes, somewhat more realistically, that their chances at each barrier are one in three, the cumulative odds that they will be able to pull off the deed drop to one in well over three billion. Other routes would-be terrorists might take to acquire a bomb are even more problematic. They are unlikely to be given or sold a bomb by a generous like-minded nuclear state for delivery abroad because the risk would be high, even for a country led by extremists, that the bomb (and its source) would be discovered even before delivery or that it would be exploded in a manner and on a target the donor would not approve, including on the donor itself. Another concern would be that the terrorist group might be infiltrated by foreign intelligence. The terrorist group might also seek to steal or illicitly purchase a “loose nuke“ somewhere. However, it seems probable that **none exist**. All governments have an intense interest in controlling any weapons on their territory because of fears that they might become the primary target. Moreover, as technology has developed, finished bombs have been out-fitted with devices that trigger a non-nuclear explosion that destroys the bomb if it is tampered with. And there are other security techniques: Bombs can be kept disassembled with the component parts stored in separate high-security vaults, and a process can be set up in which two people and multiple codes are required not only to use the bomb but to store, maintain, and deploy it. As Younger points out, “only a few people in the world have the knowledge to cause an unauthorized detonation of a nuclear weapon.” There could be dangers in the chaos that would emerge if a nuclear state were to utterly collapse; Pakistan is frequently cited in this context and sometimes North Korea as well. However, even under such conditions, nuclear weapons would probably remain under heavy guard by people who know that a purloined bomb might be used in their own territory. They would still have locks and, in the case of Pakistan, the weapons would be disassembled. The al Qaeda factor The degree to which al Qaeda, the only terrorist group that seems to want to target the United States, has pursued or even has much interest in a nuclear weapon may have been exaggerated. The 9/11 Commission stated that “al Qaeda has tried to acquire or make nuclear weapons for at least ten years,” but the only substantial evidence it supplies comes from an episode that is supposed to have taken place about 1993 in Sudan, when al Qaeda members may have sought to purchase some uranium that turned out to be bogus. Information about this supposed venture apparently comes entirely from Jamal al Fadl, who defected from al Qaeda in 1996 after being caught stealing $110,000 from the organization. Others, including the man who allegedly purchased the uranium, assert that although there were various other scams taking place at the time that may have served as grist for Fadl, the uranium episode never happened. As a key indication of al Qaeda’s desire to obtain atomic weapons, many have focused on a set of conversations in Afghanistan in August 2001 that two Pakistani nuclear scientists reportedly had with Osama bin Laden and three other al Qaeda officials. Pakistani intelligence officers characterize the discussions as “academic” in nature. It seems that the discussion was wide-ranging and rudimentary and that the scientists provided no material or specific plans. Moreover, the scientists probably were incapable of providing truly helpful information because their expertise was not in bomb design but in the processing of fissile material, which is almost certainly beyond the capacities of a nonstate group. Kalid Sheikh Mohammed, the apparent planner of the 9/11 attacks, reportedly says that al Qaeda’s bomb efforts never went beyond searching the Internet. After the fall of the Taliban in 2001, technical experts from the CIA and the Department of Energy examined documents and other information that were uncovered by intelligence agencies and the media in Afghanistan. They uncovered no credible information that al Qaeda had obtained fissile material or acquired a nuclear weapon. Moreover, they found no evidence of any radioactive material suitable for weapons. They did uncover, however, a “nuclear-related” document discussing “openly available concepts about the nuclear fuel cycle and some weapons-related issues.” Just a day or two before al Qaeda was to flee from Afghanistan in 2001, bin Laden supposedly told a Pakistani journalist, “If the United States uses chemical or nuclear weapons against us, we might respond with chemical and nuclear weapons. We possess these weapons as a deterrent.” Given the military pressure that they were then under and taking into account the evidence of the primitive or more probably nonexistent nature of al Qaeda’s nuclear program, the reported assertions, although unsettling, appear at best to be a desperate bluff. Bin Laden has made statements about nuclear weapons a few other times. Some of these pronouncements can be seen to be threatening, but they are rather coy and indirect, indicating perhaps something of an interest, but not acknowledging a capability. And as terrorism specialist Louise Richardson observes, “Statements claiming a right to possess nuclear weapons have been misinterpreted as expressing a determination to use them. This in turn has fed the exaggeration of the threat we face.” Norwegian researcher Anne Stenersen concluded after an exhaustive study of available materials that, although “it is likely that al Qaeda central has considered the option of using non-conventional weapons,” there is “little evidence that such ideas ever developed into actual plans, or that they were given any kind of priority at the expense of more traditional types of terrorist attacks.” She also notes that information on an al Qaeda computer left behind in Afghanistan in 2001 indicates that only $2,000 to $4,000 was earmarked for weapons of mass destruction research and that the money was mainly for very crude work on chemical weapons. Today, the key portions of al Qaeda central may well total only a few hundred people, apparently assisting the Taliban’s distinctly separate, far larger, and very troublesome insurgency in Afghanistan. Beyond this tiny band, there are thousands of sympathizers and would-be jihadists spread around the globe. They mainly connect in Internet chat rooms, engage in radicalizing conversations, and variously dare each other to actually do something. Any “threat,” particularly to the West, appears, then, principally to derive from self-selected people, often isolated from each other, who fantasize about performing dire deeds. From time to time some of these people, or ones closer to al Qaeda central, actually manage to do some harm. And occasionally, they may even be able to pull off something large, such as 9/11. But in most cases, their capacities and schemes, or alleged schemes, seem to be far less dangerous than initial press reports vividly, even hysterically, suggest. Most important for present purposes, however, is that any notion that al Qaeda has the capacity to acquire nuclear weapons, even if it wanted to, looks farfetched in the extreme. It is also noteworthy that, although there have been plenty of terrorist attacks in the world since 2001, all have relied on conventional destructive methods. For the most part, terrorists seem to be heeding the advice found in a memo on an al Qaeda laptop seized in Pakistan in 2004: “Make use of that which is available … rather than waste valuable time becoming despondent over that which is not within your reach.” In fact, history consistently demonstrates that terrorists prefer weapons that they know and understand, not new, exotic ones. Glenn Carle, a 23-year CIA veteran and once its deputy intelligence officer for transnational threats, warns, “We must not take fright at the specter our leaders have exaggerated. In fact, we must see jihadists for the small, lethal, disjointed, and miserable opponents that they are.” al Qaeda, he says, has only a handful of individuals capable of planning, organizing, and leading a terrorist organization, and although the group has threatened attacks with nuclear weapons, “its capabilities are far inferior to its desires.” Policy alternatives The purpose here has not been to argue that policies designed to inconvenience the atomic terrorist are necessarily unneeded or unwise. Rather, in contrast with the many who insist that atomic terrorism under current conditions is rather likely— indeed, exceedingly likely—to come about, I have contended that it is hugely unlikely. However, it is important to consider not only the likelihood that an event will take place, but also its consequences. Therefore, one must be concerned about catastrophic events even if their probability is small, and efforts to reduce that likelihood even further may well be justified. At some point, however, probabilities become so low that, even for catastrophic events, it may make sense to ignore them or at least put them on the back burner; in short, the risk becomes acceptable. For example, the British could at any time attack the United States with their submarine-launched missiles and kill millions of Americans, far more than even the most monumentally gifted and lucky terrorist group. Yet the risk that this potential calamity might take place evokes little concern; essentially it is an acceptable risk. Meanwhile, Russia, with whom the United States has a rather strained relationship, could at any time do vastly more damage with its nuclear weapons, a fully imaginable calamity that is substantially ignored. In constructing what he calls “a case for fear,” Cass Sunstein, a scholar and current Obama administration official, has pointed out that if there is a yearly probability of 1 in 100,000 that terrorists could launch a nuclear or massive biological attack, the risk would cumulate to 1 in 10,000 over 10 years and to 1 in 5,000 over 20. These odds, he suggests, are “not the most comforting.” Comfort, of course, lies in the viscera of those to be comforted, and, as he suggests, many would probably have difficulty settling down with odds like that. But there must be some point at which the concerns even of these people would ease. Just perhaps it is at one of the levels suggested above: one in a million or one in three billion per attempt.

**Their terrorism advantage is epistemologically suspect---the ballot is crucial to reject state-sponsored knowledge that legitimizes global violence**

**Raphael 9**—IR, Kingston University (Sam, Critical terrorism studies, ed. Richard Jackson, 49-51) ellipses in orig.

Over the past thirty years, a small but politically-significant academic field of ‘terrorism studies’ has emerged from the relatively disparate research efforts of the 1960s and 1970s, and consolidated its position as a viable subset of ‘security studies’ (Reid, 1993: 22; Laqueur, 2003: 141). Despite continuing concerns that the concept of ‘terrorism’, as nothing more than a specific socio-political phenomenon, is not substantial enough to warrant an entire field of study (see Horgan and Boyle, 2008), it is nevertheless possible to identify a core set of scholars writing on the subject who together constitute an ‘epistemic community’ (Haas, 1992: 2–3). That is, there exists a ‘network of knowledge-based experts’ who have ‘recognised expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain’. This community, or ‘network of productive authors’, has operated by establishing research agendas, recruiting new members, securing funding opportunities, sponsoring conferences, maintaining informal contacts, and linking separate research groups (Reid, 1993, 1997). Regardless of the largely academic debate over whether the study of terrorism should constitute an independent field, the existence of a clearly-identifiable research community (with particular individuals at its core) is a social fact.2¶ Further, this community has traditionally had significant influence when it comes to the formulation of government policy, particularly in the United States. It is not the case that the academic field of terrorism studies operates solely in the ivory towers of higher education; as noted in previous studies (Schmid and Jongman, 1988: 180; Burnett and Whyte, 2005), it is a community which has intricate and multifaceted links with the structures and agents of state power, most obviously in Washington. Thus, many recognised terrorism experts have either had prior employment with, or major research contracts from, the Pentagon, the Central Intelligence Agency, the State Department, and other key US Government agencies (Herman and O’Sullivan, 1989: 142–190; RAND, 2004). Likewise, a high proportion of ‘core experts’ in the field (see below) have been called over the past thirty years to testify in front of Congress on the subject of terrorism (Raphael, forthcoming). Either way, these scholars have fed their ‘knowledge’ straight into the policymaking process in the US.3¶ The close relationship between the academic field of terrorism studies and the US state means that it is critically important to analyse the research output from key experts within the community. This is particularly the case because of the aura of objectivity surrounding the terrorism ‘knowledge’ generated by academic experts. Running throughout the core literature is a positivist assumption, explicitly stated or otherwise, that the research conducted is apolitical and objective (see for example, Hoffman, 1992: 27; Wilkinson, 2003). There is little to no reflexivity on behalf of the scholars, who see themselves as wholly dissociated from the politics surrounding the subject of terrorism. This reification of academic knowledge about terrorism is reinforced by those in positions of power in the US who tend to distinguish the experts from other kinds of overtly political actors. For example, academics are introduced to Congressional hearings in a manner which privileges their nonpartisan input:¶ Good morning. The Special Oversight Panel on Terrorism meets in open session to receive testimony and discuss the present and future course of terrorism in the Middle East. . . . It has been the Terrorism Panel’s practice, in the interests of objectivity and gathering all the facts, to pair classified briefings and open briefings. . . . This way we garner the best that the classified world of intelligence has to offer and the best from independent scholars working in universities, think tanks, and other institutions . . .¶ (Saxton, 2000, emphasis added)¶ The representation of terrorism expertise as ‘independent’ and as providing ‘objectivity’ and ‘facts’ has significance for its contribution to the policymaking process in the US. This is particularly the case given that, as we will see, core experts tend to insulate the broad direction of US policy from critique. Indeed, as Alexander George noted, it is precisely because ‘they are trained to clothe their work in the trappings of objectivity, independence and scholarship’ that expert research is ‘particularly effective in securing influence and respect for’ the claims made by US policymakers (George, 1991b: 77).¶ Given this, it becomes vital to subject the content of terrorism studies to close scrutiny. Based upon a wider, systematic study of the research output of key figures within the field (Raphael, forthcoming), and building upon previous critiques of terrorism expertise (see Chomsky and Herman, 1979; Herman, 1982; Herman and O’Sullivan, 1989; Chomsky, 1991; George, 1991b; Jackson, 2007g), this chapter aims to provide a critical analysis of some of the major claims made by these experts and to reveal the ideological functions served by much of the research. Rather than doing so across the board, this chapter focuses on research on the subject of terrorism from the global South which is seen to challenge US interests. Examining this aspect of research is important, given that the ‘threat’ from this form of terrorism has led the US and its allies to intervene throughout the South on behalf of their national security, with profound consequences for the human security of people in the region.¶ Specifically, this chapter examines two major problematic features which characterise much of the field’s research. First, in the context of anti-US terrorism in the South, many important claims made by key terrorism experts simply replicate official US government analyses. This replication is facilitated primarily through a sustained and uncritical reliance on selective US government sources, combined with the frequent use of unsubstantiated assertion. This is significant, not least because official analyses have often been revealed as presenting a politically-motivated account of the subject. Second, and partially as a result of this mirroring of government claims, the field tends to insulate from critique those ‘counterterrorism’ policies justified as a response to the terrorist threat. In particular, the experts overwhelmingly ‘silence’ the way terrorism is itself often used as a central strategy within US-led counterterrorist interventions in the South. That is, ‘counterterrorism’ campaigns executed or supported by Washington often deploy terrorism as a mode of controlling violence (Crelinsten, 2002: 83; Stohl, 2006: 18–19).¶ These two features of the literature are hugely significant. Overall, the core figures in terrorism studies have, wittingly or otherwise, produced a body of work plagued by substantive problems which together shatter the illusion of ‘objectivity’. Moreover, the research output can be seen to serve a very particular ideological function for US foreign policy. Across the past thirty years, it has largely served the interests of US state power, primarily through legitimising an extensive set of coercive interventions in the global South undertaken under the rubric of various ‘war(s) on terror’. After setting out the method by which key experts within the field have been identified, this chapter will outline the two main problematic features which characterise much of the research output by these scholars. It will then discuss the function that this research serves for the US state.

**The impact is extinction**

Valenzuela 5(Manuel, The Making of the Enemy, 19 December 2005, http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Why\_They\_Hate\_Us/Making\_Enemies.html)

Hidden behind dark corners, lurking underneath beds, **fantasy bogeymen** not known or understood are mutated by marketers and propagandists who understand human psychology well into demons haunting the deep and frail recesses of the human mind. Humans not known or understood, alien in culture and language, masked in foreign appearance and color are easily transformed into creatures evil and degenerate, threats to the vitality of so-called freedom and democracy. For ignorance invariably leads to fear of the unknown and, if propagandized correctly, an entire population can be easily manipulated into allowing itself to be controlled and exploited by the Establishment. The ingrained mammalian instinct of security, both of the citizenry and that of their children, can be easily exploited by the corporatists, made to be of paramount importance, manipulated as only being made secure by purchasing the products of the corporation and by acquiescing to the draconian measures of the state. Through the televised media, the attempt to birth perpetual fear into the populace has never been easier to accomplish. Images, sound and opinion can be bombarded day in and day out to the easily receptive American citizen, many of which have become dumbed-down couch potatoes spoon fed their thoughts through the monitor they have become addicted to. Through the manipulation of televised images and sounds, the doctors of propaganda can hypnotize and control the thoughts of Americans, using all tools at their disposal to concoct the perfect bogeymen. The evildoers designed to captivate the fear-controlled mind of the masses are created to serve the interests of the Establishment, helping to steer the population in the direction most beneficial to the elite while at the same time working to mobilize millions into supporting the activities and illegalities ultimately detrimental to the people themselves. During the so-called Cold War, for example, the enemy created was the dreaded Soviet Communist, birthed to unleash terror in the dreams of average Americans. At the time, America's military industrial complex, along with the omnipresent corporate world, saw that a nation in a perpetual war footing could be more readily controlled, its people made to serve the interests of the Establishment. Using a cocktail of jingoism, nationalism, xenophobia, fear mongering and hate baiting, the propagandists were successful in breeding a hatred of anything related to Soviet Russia, including its innocent citizens. Through the control of the masses, manipulated to accept and even demand a perpetual war footing, profits to corporations became enormous, power over government became real and control over the course of America became a reality. With the population in the stupor of fear and hatred, dominated by fascinations of nationalism and sensationalistic displays of greatness, its collective mind occupied by the rabid pursuit of Soviet defeat, the corporatist dominion over America, as well as the Third World, triumphed, giving rise to a geopolitical chess match for corporate control over the lands, resources and peoples of the underdeveloped world. This game, a fight for profit, power and hegemony, resulted in the ceaseless poverty, disease, under-education, exploitation and death of millions of human beings, for generations now their destinies made to subsist in endemic poverty, with talents eroded and lives in perpetual limbo, their lands and economies still to this day not having recovered from the devastation the Cold War years spawned. Just like the corporatist elite were able to control their own masses, conquer the resources, lands and peoples of the south, thereby enriching themselves beyond compare, manipulating Cold War indoctrinated fears and hatreds to silence, control and make indifferent the masses, using the media to maintain a state of ignorance throughout the nation, so now in the Middle East and Central Asia do they see the grand prize: further empowerment over us as well as control of the world's remaining underground fields of oil. Once again, an enemy has been conveniently manufactured out of the dark rooms of Madison Avenue focus groups to fit nicely into the agenda of the corporatists and neocons in power. Serving the interests of the corporatists, fundamentalist Islamicists, of which only a small minority exists willing to commit violence, make a great enemy from which to hypnotize the population: unknown, alien, of different culture and language, existing in multiple desired states, dark skinned, invisible, violent and perhaps most importantly, of a religious belief system at odds with the fundamentalist Christian orthodoxy dominant in today's America. The systemic marketing of Muslims and Arabs and Persians as external threats capable of destroying our way of life, our religious norms, and the cherished charades of freedom and democracy is, therefore, the perfect weapon launched against the masses, for naturally we impute the actions of a minute lunatic fringe with all Muslim people, allowing the terror of a few miscreants to penetrate our fragile psyches and our even more fragile belief structure. Through the methodical brainwashing used in Hollywood and the corporate media, the Arab/Persian is made to be a rabid demon wishing death upon our children's future, ready at any moment to blow himself up, committing heinous acts of barbarity, murdering and bombing and rampaging, for he is a terrorist, the descendant of the Soviet, the next adaptation of American enemy, the next marketable wonder the corporatists exploit to enrapture our minds and control our lives. The Arab/Persian as enemy serves to militarize the mind of the population, to **distract us from more ominous, internal threats**, to control and brainwash the weaker minded among us, creating a marching army of "good Germans." **It helps mobilize the country towards a perpetual war footing**, acting as an excuse to wage war, to increase the profits and wealth and power of the corporatists, and to further lead America down the road to eventual fascism. Through war the military-energy-industrial complex and the corporate world can further engorge themselves, using the energy and wages of the masses for the construction of their weapons of death and suffering. Through war they can lay claim to the resources of the Middle East, the all-important lifeline to continued economic dominance. Using Arabs and/or Persians - who just happen to be native peoples of the Middle East, the very same lands saturated with underground fields of oil that the military-energy industrial complex craves - as the new American enemy gives our corporatist government the perfect excuse to invade, occupy and devastate desired lands with American imposed capitalism. Accorded the face of evildoer extraordinaire, stereotyped and marginalized through the lens of fiction, the Arab/Persian people, diverse and complex, unknown to the undereducated, act as the key to unlocking the American people's historical reluctance to fight wars both immoral and of choice. If the Arab/Persian can be demonized to be hated and feared by a population brainwashed by the hypnotizing glare of television, the nation will be much easier to militarize, the people's children will be much easier to enlist as cannon fodder and the internal policies of the nation will be much easier to control and manipulate. The sustained viability of the nation's militarization - and some would say the ongoing embezzlement of the people's treasure by corporatists - desired by corporatists in power **depends on** the Arab and Persian and **Muslim people remaining**, in the conscious of the masses, forever **an enemy**, always a demon, their reputation strong enough to make of them a most potent adversary, capable of hijacking airplanes, destroying skyscrapers and threatening to strike fear amongst the population, as always hating our way of life. What better scapegoat than the Arab/Persian population if one wants to conquer the resources of the Middle East and Central Asia? What greater marketing ploy could be manufactured to make enemies of the same people whose resources you desire? And, with the war on terror acting as a vicious circle of recruitment, by becoming a self fulfilling prophesy, having violence beget violence, with more and more Arabs incensed at the actions of America, ready to join in jihad where only few extremists existed before, (Al-Qaeda has become a mass movement, franchised and claimed by many insurgents, most of whom have never met a real member of the group) thereby creating ever more non-fictitious enemies, the military-energy industrial complex has the capacity and will to continue the war into perpetuity, using the anger on the Muslim street, along with the fear and hatred of Americans, to further its own interests, exploiting both Muslim and American, pitting one against the other, creating fictitious conflict where none exists, concocting enemies out of two peoples whose similarities as humans quashes our differences of culture. For a citizenry made to fear an alien people of which little is known about, with hatred and xenophobia running through their veins, programmed by the keepers at the gate to demand blood and death, can, at the push of a few psychological buttons, be mobilized into a war frenzy where the human brain, thinking, analytical and logical, is set aside and replaced by our primitive, mammalian brain, full of primordial behaviors and emotions. Once the population's collective conscious has mutated according to the designs of their puppeteers the march towards war, invasion and occupation can commence.

Terror rhetoric creates a perpetual state of fear permeating our lives that remakes the public sphere, placing dissent as the enemy

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The war on terror has been as much a war against the American people, therefore, as a war against Arabs and Muslims (American or otherwise) and anyone else the U.S. ruling elite—which includes Democrats with Repub- licans—perceives as an enemy. The specter of terrorist enemies abroad, all apparently out to get ‘‘us,’’ magniﬁes the threat back home, and the newly formed Department of Homeland Security starts to warn ‘‘yellow,’’ shouts ‘‘orange,’’ screams ‘‘RED!’’ The intensiﬁcation of fear at home accentuates the threat abroad, which remagniﬁes the fear at home. An ontological sense of terror infects daily life as patriots are insidiously enticed to spy on those around them: ‘‘If you see something say something,’’ reads a post-9/11 public notice on the New York subway. The synergy between war abroad and the war at home remakes the public sphere; that which was once grotesque now fades away as a bland back- ground. This is true not just of U.S. criminality in Abu Ghraib, Bagram, and Guantánamo or British atrocities in Basra, but also of public discourse at home. Right-wing radio shows have dominated the airwaves with outra- geous demands for U.S. belligerence in search of imperial dominance, justi- ﬁed as an American birthright. Racism buttresses hatred, which buttresses racism, and so on. To choose just one of many examples, the talk show Imus in the Morning is habitually and viciously anti-Arab, once demeaning Arabs as ‘‘goat-humping weasels.’’ The Imus show celebrated Yasser Arafat’s death by calling Palestinians ‘‘stinking animals,’’ then advocated that the United States ‘‘drop the bomb and kill everybody’’ in Palestine. This was no unguarded comment; it was a serious statement on the MSNBC news network. Several weeks later, Vice President Dick Cheney appeared on the Imus show to publicize the possibility of an attack on Iran (by the United States or Israel), which he called ‘‘a noted sponsor of terror’’ and ‘‘top of the list’’ of future trouble spots. As Antonio Gramsci once noted in a rather dif- ferent context, one can predict the future to the extent one is involved in making it happen.11

Their rhetoric of terrorism divides the world into Manichean terms and prevents solvency

Pillar 12 (Paul Pillar, professor of Security Studies at Georgetown, 9-4-12, “Dividing the World into Terrorists and the Rest,” http://nationalinterest.org/blog/paul-pillar/dividing-the-world-terrorists-the-rest-7426)

The common American tendency to view the outside world in starkly divided Manichean terms between friends, allies and good guys on one side and adversaries and evil-doers on the other side arises in many circumstances but seems especially marked in discussions of terrorism. The tendency is most visible in how the lists that have become mainstays of counterterrorist policy are widely perceived. The U.S. list of foreign terrorist organizations had an almost mundane purpose when it was established by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. One of the principal features of that legislation was to criminalize the provision of material support to any foreign terrorist organization. This made necessary clear definitions not only of material support but also of foreign terrorist organizations. Hence the creation of the list, entries on which are determined by the secretary of state with the participation of other executive departments and according to criteria specified in the statute. Notwithstanding this purpose—support to the enforcement of a criminal law—the list of foreign terrorist organizations gets regarded as if it were a more general act of condemnation that embodies what overall U.S. policy toward a given group is or ought to be. It is taken as a declaration of who is in the bad guys' camp and who is not. Listing or delisting of a particular group gets promoted by those with an agenda that has nothing to do with enforcement of a criminal statute. This has been seen most obviously with the well-financed campaign to delist the Iranian cult-cum-terrorist group the Mujahedin-e Khalq. Or pushing for a particular group's listing is a way of making a statement, as has most recently been the case with the question of whether to list the Haqqani group of Afghanistan and Pakistan. This way of looking at the list has several disadvantages. It constitutes pressure to politicize what is supposed to be an administrative and legal decision. It increases the potential negative consequences of listing a group because non-Americans follow the American lead in looking at listing as a general act of condemnation. Listing of the Haqqani group, however much it may be legally warranted under the terms of the relevant statute, might complicate not only U.S. relations with Pakistan but also any future efforts to negotiate an Afghan peace with the Taliban. Sharply dividing groups into ones that get the terrorist label and thus are to be condemned and those that are not so labeled and condemned does not correspond to the messy reality of what groups do and don't do. Lebanese Hezbollah is perhaps the foremost example of a group that is known (and listed) in the United States as a terrorist group but is also much more than that. Instead of exploring different options in intelligently dealing with this multifaceted group, more attention gets devoted in a simplistic way to U.S.-European differences on whether Hezbollah “is” a terrorist group—i.e., is officially listed and branded as such. A related problem is how putting a group on the bad side of the good guys/bad guys divide reduces one's policy flexibility because this one act of branding tends to preclude any engagement with the group, no matter how much such engagement would make sense. Probably the premier example is Hamas. The International Crisis Group recently observed that the ostracism of Hamas may entail yet another costly missed opportunity in the Middle East. The rigid perceptual division of friends and enemies and the tendency to associate bad behavior such as terrorism only with the enemies does not correspond to actual behavioral patterns. It means, for example, overlooking in the Middle East Jewish terrorism until it occurs frequently enough to make it impossible to overlook entirely. In the United States it means a tendency to consider all terrorism worth worrying about to be Islamist and to discourage attention to other varieties that, based on what has been happening inside the United States, are worth worrying about at least as much. We would be better advised to remember that terrorism is a tactic, not a fixed set of protagonists who are the only ones ever to use it. We should also remember that good and evil are pretty widely distributed in the world and not just confined to different parts of it.

Link turn – Drone strikes drive AQAP recruitment in Yemen

Spencer Ackerman 8/12/13, National security editor for Guardian, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/12/yemen-drone-strikes-us-policy

**If the barrage of US drone strikes** over the last week weakened **al-Qaida's Yemen affiliate, the terrorist organization** that has captured Washington's attention **isn't acting like it**. **Not only is it vowing another attack, it has prompted the US to keep its Yemen embassy closed while reopening all the others** – implicitly **highlighting the weakness of the US policy of launching drone strikes first and asking questions late**r. Intelligence chatter indicating an imminent attack by al-Qaida in the Arabian peninsula (Aqap) prompted two reactions by Washington. The first was to order a dramatic, temporary shutdown at embassies and consulates throughout the Middle East and Africa. The second was to order a surge in drone strikes in Yemen. A Saturday strike marked the ninth such attack in two weeks. At least 38 suspected "militants" are reported dead. Throughout 2013, **the US has launched 21 airstrikes in Yemen**, the vast majority from drones; **displacing Pakistan as the epicenter of the covert air war**, which has seen 18 strikes thus far, according to statistics compiled by the Long War Journal, which tracks the drones closely. Should that trend hold, **it would mean there would be more annual US drone strikes in Yemen than in Pakistan**, the home of al-Qaida's central leadership, for the first time in the entire post-9/11 era. The steady rise in drone attacks strikes some as an ominous sign about America's true capabilities in Yemen four years after identifying Aqap as a major terrorist threat. "**The US doesn't seem to have good human intelligence [in Yemen]**. **It's essentially bombing and hoping, which is neither sustainable nor wise**," said Gregory Johnsen, author of The Last Refuge: Yemen, al-Qaeda, and America's War in Arabia. "It doesn't seem to have an impact on al-Qaida in the Arabian peninsula." The strikes, conducted under parallel programs run by the CIA and the military's Joint Special Operations Command, are significant not only for their intensity and timing. A US official acknowledged to the New York Times that **they are no longer targeting simply the top tier of leadership in Aqap** – **an expansion that may be hard to reconcile with** President Obama's **May pledge to rein in the drone campaign.** "Before, we couldn't necessarily go after a driver for the organization; it'd have to be an operations director," an anonymous official told the Times. "Now that driver becomes fair game because he's providing direct support to the plot." But while Obama indicated he would restrict the drone campaign during a May 23 speech at the National Defense University, his criteria for using lethal force left the CIA and the military with significant leeway. He did not pledge to only kill senior leaders of terrorist organizations – although his reference to "highly skilled al-Qaida commanders, trainers, bomb makers and operatives" may have left that impression. A White House factsheet issued after the speech referred to killing "a senior operational leader of a terrorist organization or the forces that organization is using or intends to use to conduct terrorist attacks" as long as the strike is lawful. Either way, expanding the pool of eligible targets for strikes is rarely a sign that the power launching them believes itself to be winning. Yet such expansion has been a feature of the drone campaigns in Yemen and Pakistan before it: intelligence and military officials have succeeded in both countries to launch strikes against suspected militants without even knowing their names, something known by the shorthand "signature strikes." Any individual strike might perhaps be sound; or have a tactical effect on Aqap. But the organization hardly sounds like it's under stress. On Monday, Aqap's leader, Nasir al-Wuhayshi, vowed in an unusual letter to free Aqap prisoners in Yemen. "Your brothers are about to bring down the walls and thrones of evil," Wuhayshi said in a rare public communication. Not only did Wuhayshi himself break out of a Yemeni jail in 2006, but several recent prison breaks around the Middle East and south Asia have sparked fears of resurgent al-Qaida affiliates, particularly when compared to weak governments in their host countries. Wuhayshi's message came a day after gunmen ambushed and killed five Yemeni soldiers guarding an oil and gas installation in the country's south. Aqap is suspected of involvement – just days after Yemen boasted of disrupting a major Aqap plot; and despite the drone barrage. The US State Department, meanwhile, has reopened all the diplomatic facilities it abruptly shuttered last week in response to fears of an Aqap attack. The exception is in Yemen, where the Sana'a embassy remains closed. State Department representatives did not respond to a request for comment. **The human consequences of the interlocking wars in Yemen** – Aqap's war against the Yemeni government; the Yemeni government's war to reestablish its control over its population; the US war against Aqap and its support of the Yemeni government– **are profound**. While it is unknown exactly how many people have died in US drone strikes, cruise missile strikes and raids, several hundred is a consensus range. Then **there is the psychological effect.** On July 31, a Yemeni man named Faisal bin Ali Jabar wrote to Yemeni president Abdo Rabu Mansour Hadi and Barack Obama to seek answers about the deaths of his brother-in-law and nephew in an August 2012 drone strike. "Our family are not your enemy. In fact, the people you killed had strongly and publicly opposed al-Qaida. Salem was an imam. The Friday before his death, he gave a guest sermon in the Khashamir mosque denouncing al-Qaida's hateful ideology. It was not the first of these sermons, but regrettably, it was his last," Jabar wrote. Earlier this year, a US Senate panel heard for the first time from a Yemeni, activist and journalist Farea al-Muslimi, who sought to explain how deeply drones had affected average Yemenis, even those who never lost anyone in a strike. Muslimi testified that parents now scare their children into behaving by threatening to send a drone after them. He warned that the drone strikes were instilling "psychological fear and terror." Muslimi spent last week tweeting about surveillance planes loitering overhead of his home in Yemen to underscore the fears ordinary Yemenis have during the current emergency. He vented about the way presumption given in the media to the US that anyone killed by a drone was a member of Aqap. "Th # of times media says "suspected militants n #Yemen" makes me thnk All living n yemen, including foreign diplomats, r suspected militants," Muslimi tweeted Sunday. "The US is running to drones every time its counter-terrorism efforts fail," Muslimi wrote in Sunday's Independent. "**On each occasion the public rage against a**l-**Q**aida in the **A**rabian **p**eninsula **grows and its image is tarnished, and the US** – via drone strikes – **restores it again. In its recent actions**, **the US has become al-Qaida's public relations officer.**" As the US keeps the Sana'a embassy closed and drone-fired missiles keep pounding Yemen, **experts are wondering when Washington will develop a strategy for Yemen more sophisticated than bombing and providing a measure of foreign aid**. "I **don't see the US having a strategy or policy. I see it as having an approach – one that's fluctuating, depending on how severe the threat is,"** Johnsen said. That being: drones strikes. "I think US has two goals in Yemen," Johnsen explains. "One is: it wants to prevent any sort of Aqap attack on the US homeland or US interests in the Middle East. Second: making sure no official Americans die. Those are both very defensive goals. The two primary, goals when you see what US is doing in Yemen – those are things the US wants to avoid."

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Situatedness determines political efficacy

Dillon 99 (Michael Dillon, professor of politics at the University of Lancaster, 1999, “Moral Spaces: Rethinking Ethics and World Politics,” pp 97-8)

Heirs to all this, we find ourselves in the turbulent and now globalized wake of its confluence. As Heidegger-himself an especially revealing figure of the deep and mutual implication of the philosophical and the political4-never tired of pointing out, the relevance of ontology to all other kinds of thinking is fundamental and inescapable. For one cannot say anything about anything that is, without always already having made assumptions about the is as such. Any mode of thought, in short, always already carries an ontology sequestered within it. What this ontological turn does to other regional modes of thought is to challenge the ontology within which they operate. The implications of that review reverberate throughout the entire mode of thought, demanding a reappraisal as fundamental as the reappraisal ontology has demanded of philosophy. With ontology at issue, the entire foundations or underpinnings of any mode of thought are rendered problematic. This applies as much to any modern discipline of thought as it does to the question of modernity as such, with the exception, it seems, of science, which, having long ago given up the ontological questioning of when it called itself natural philosophy, appears now, in its industrialized and corporatized form, to be invulnerable to ontological perturbation. With its foundations at issue, the very authority of a mode of thought and the ways in which it characterizes the critical issues of freedom and judgment (of what kind of universe human beings inhabit, how they inhabit it, and what counts as reliable knowledge for them in it) is also put in question. The very ways in which Nietzsche, Heidegger, and other continental philosophers challenged Western ontology, simultaneously, therefore reposed the fundamental and inescapable difficulty, or aporia, for human being of decision and judgment. In other words, whatever ontology you subscribe to, knowingly or unknowingly, as a human being you still have to act. Whether or not you know or acknowledge it, the ontology you subscribe to will construe the problem of action for you in one way rather than another. You may think ontology is some arcane question of philosophy, but Nietzsche and Heidegger showed that it intimately shapes not only a way of thinking, but a way of being, a form of life. Decision, a fortiori political decision, in short, is no mere technique. It is instead a way of being that bears an understanding of Being, and of the fundaments of the human way of being within it. This applies, indeed applies most, to those mock innocent political slaves who claim only to be technocrats of decision making.

**Framing determines the outcomes of policy – uniquely true in the context of security**

**Calkivik 10** (Emine Asli Calkivik, PhD in political science from the University of Minnesota, October 2010, “Dismantling Security,” <http://purl.umn.edu/99479>) gz

In contrast to traditional approaches to security, which assume an objective¶ world that operates according to ahistorical formal models and rely on a statist¶ political ontology that naturalizes the meaning of what security is and how it can be¶ achieved,120 critical approaches attend to the relations of power that structure the¶ production of in/securities and expose the processes by which national identities and¶ what are deemed as a danger to those identities are constructed. A common point¶ shared by these engagements is their emphasis on the ethical dimension of scholarly¶ inquiry as well as the recognition that knowledge claims are always embedded in¶ relations of power. Their emphasis on the “ought” rather than the “is” reflects less a¶ reworking of the hierarchy between material and ideational power than an emphasis¶ on the social nature of global politics and an understanding that all phenomenon¶ pertaining to international relations exists through the cultural and ideological¶ structures through which they are given meaning and legitimated.121¶ Definition and construction of threats and the way in which states respond to¶ those threats constitutes one of the primary items on the agenda of critical scholars.122¶ While conventional analyses of security conceive threats as arising from material¶ capabilities of sovereign states located in a self-help system, critical approaches point¶ to the ways in which threats and intentions are not objectively given but socially¶ constructed: they involve history, culture, and power relations that cannot be reduced¶ to an objective measure of military capabilities. They investigate the ways in which¶ systems of signification and normative structures constrain or regulate collective¶ security practices or transform conduct in war. All of these studies reveal the¶ historically situated dynamics underlying practices that shape the desire to secure¶ bodies, nations, and states.¶ Primary examples of these engagements come from scholars working under¶ the broad banner of Constructivism.123 These scholars take as their premise the¶ proposition that interests and actions of states are socially constructed and therefore¶ subject to change. While leaving intact the traditional assumptions about military and¶ state-centric understandings of security, some of these studies nevertheless challenge¶ the traditional frameworks by explaining security practices through a recourse to¶ ideational elements such as norms and identities rather than relying on material¶ factors.124 In particular, these works challenge Neorealist and Neoliberal approaches,¶ which assume that states are rational, self-help actors in an anarchic environment. For¶ instance, Alexander Wendt in his seminal study shows how different (Hobbesian or¶ Kantian) anarchical cultures can play a role in channeling the security practices of¶ states on different paths.125 Focusing on international norms, such as the prohibitions¶ against the use of chemical and nuclear weapons or norms of humanitarian¶ intervention, other scholars argue that questions about international security cannot be¶ answered by Realist materialist explanations alone.126 An example to these¶ investigations is provided by Risse-Kappen, who argues that NATO’s post-Cold War¶ survival can only be explained with reference to ideational factors such as values and¶ identity—in this case, democratic, liberal values—that guarantee the institution’s¶ survival in the absence of a distinct threat.127¶ The post-Cold War security environment and proliferating threat discourses in¶ the absence of the “Soviet enemy” provide ample resource for scholars who focus on¶ the representational practices that played role in the construction of threats to state¶ security. For instance, Mutimer examines in detail the linguistic and metaphorical¶ construction of threats to the United States and its allies through the “image of¶ proliferation.”128 He points out the way in which a particular discursive framing of a¶ problem—in this case, the construction of the use of chemical or biological weapons¶ as a problem of proliferation as opposed to a problem of disarmament—shapes the¶ constitution of identities and interests of the actors in question and gives way to¶ particular patterns of foreign policy.¶ The discourse of threats and their social production—as well as the¶ construction of the objects of security as an inextricable aspect of security¶ discourses—constitutes an important item on the agenda of critical investigations.129¶ In conventional analyses, the purported state of nature populated by instrumentally¶ rational actors is taken as the departure point of analysis. Within this framework, the¶ state acts as the primary source of authority, the guarantor of order, and the primary¶ protector of the values and interests of these individuals. While the state is rendered¶ the locus of security, security of the state gets equated to the security of the citizen. In¶ contrast to the positing of the state as the locus of security with a neutrally given¶ interest of survival, critical scholars argue that a concept like national security needs to¶ be understood as a social construction rather than an objectively given fact. For¶ instance, in her case study of the Cuban missile crisis, Jutta Weldes shows how a core¶ concept such as the national interest is discursively constituted through¶ representational practices and linguistic elements.130 Other investigations explore the¶ working of security as a political practice, or the processes of construction of threats¶ through institutional mobilization and knowledge production. Some of these scholars¶ use “speech-act theory” to study how utterances of security constitute certain issues as¶ security problems.131¶ A related line of analysis, conducted mostly from post-structural and postcolonial¶ perspectives, is to trace the operation of power in its various guises and to¶ map the hierarchical relations, highlighting the gaps and silences of hegemonic¶ security narratives. In his Writing Security, David Campbell investigates how certain¶ risks are interpreted as dangers, what power effects these interpretative articulations¶ produce, and how they police the boundaries of the political community and produce¶ obedient subjects.132 Going against the grain of state-centric, strategic accounts of war,¶ scholars such as Michael Shapiro bring to focus the role of political violence in the¶ construction of the geopolitical imaginary and the production/ affirmation of collective¶ identity.133 Others focus on the international interventions that took place during the¶ 1990s and discuss the ways in which these imperial investments are legitimated by the¶ West through a moral discourse based on universal values.134¶ Other studies lay bare the historical biases, Eurocentric assumptions, and¶ racialized or gendered content of conceptions, analyses, theories, and practices of¶ security. Attending to the power of representation, they expose the links between¶ economies of power and “truth” in the re/production of international hierarchies and¶ in/securities. Problematizing the representation of post-colonial states as “failed” or¶ lacking, and hence as a major threat to international security, some of these scholars¶ demonstrate how these so-called failures were precisely the products of unequal¶ encounters with Western colonialism, pointing out the ways in which these¶ hierarchical relations were being reproduced through ongoing unequal economic,¶ social, and military relations.135 They analyze the construction of the non-Western¶ subject as the inferior other—“the Southern” or “the Oriental”—and attend to the¶ ways in which these representations are mobilized to legitimate certain security¶ practices and policies such as nuclear proliferation in the Third World.136 Introducing¶ feminist perspectives into their analyses, other scholars expose the gender biases¶ imbued in security practices, problematizing state security for rendering violence and¶ insecurity from the perspective of women.137

Theoretical thinking concerning security problematizes militarized practices – it constitutes reality

Bilgin, 5– Professor of IR, Bikent University, *Regional Security In The Middle East A Critical Perspective*, Page 7

From a critical perspective, thinking differently about security involves: first, challenging the ways in which security has traditionally been conceptualised by broadening and deepening the concept and by rejecting the primacy given to the sovereign state as the primary referent for, and agent of, security. Critical approaches also problematise the **militarised** and zero-sum practices informed by prevailing discourses and call for reconceptualising practice. Second, thinking differently entails rejecting the conception of theory as a neutral tool, which merely explains social phenomena, and emphasises the mutually constitutive relationship between theory and practice. That is, the way we (the community of students of security) think and write about security informs practice; it privileges certain practices whilst marginalising others, thereby helping **constitute** what human beings choose to call **'reality'**. Theory is itself a form of practice; theorising is recognised as a political activity. Finally, adopting a critical approach to security implies adopting an explicitly normative (for some, emancipation-oriented) approach to security in theory and practice.

Giving the tool of imagination over to the state exonerates us from responsibility – we should imagine our own role in violence

**Kappeler 95** (Susanne, The Will to Violence, pgs 9-11)

War does not suddenly break out in a peaceful society; sexual violence is not the disturbance of otherwise equal gender relations. Racist attacks do not shoot like lightning out of a non-racist sky, and the sexual exploitation of children is no solitary problem in a world otherwise just to children. The violence of our most commonsense everyday thinking, and especially our personal will to violence, constitute the conceptual preparation , the ideological armament and the intellectual mobilization which make the 'outbreak' of war, of sexual violence , of racist attacks, of murder and destruction possible at all. 'We are the war,' writes Slavenka Drakulic at the end of her existential analysis of the question, 'what is war?': I do not know what war is, I want to tell my friend, but I see it everywhere . It is in the blood-soaked street in Sarajevo, after 20 people have been killed while they queued for bread. But it is also in your non-comprehension, in my unconscious cruelty towards you. in the fact that you have a yellow form [for refugees] and I don't, in the way in which it grows inside ourselves and changes our feelings, relationships, values - in short: us. We are the war. , , And I am afraid that we cannot hold anyone else responsible. We make this war possible , we permit it to happen. 'We are the war' - and we also are' the sexual violence , the racist violence , the exploitation and the will to violence in all its manifestations in a society in so-called 'peacetime", for we make them possible and we permit them to happen. 'We are the war' does not mean that the responsibility for a war is shared collectively and diffusely by an entire society - which would be equivalent to exonerating warlords and politicians and profiteers or, as Ulrich Beck says, upholding the notion of 'collective irresponsibility', where people are no longer held responsible for their actions, and where the conception of universal responsibility becomes the equivalent of a universal acquittal. 6 On the contrary, the object is precisely to analyse the specific and differential responsibility of everyone in their diverse situations. Decisions to unleash a war are indeed taken at particular levels of power by those in a position to make them and to command such collective action. We need to hold them clearly responsible for their decisions and actions without lessening theirs by any collective 'assumption' of responsibility. Yet our habit of focusing on the stage where the major dramas of power take place tends to obscure our sight in relation to our own sphere of competence, our own power and our own responsibility - leading to the well- known illusion of our apparent 'powerlessness' and its accompanying phenomenon - our so-called political disillusionment. Single citizens even more so those of other nations - have come to feel secure in their obvious non-responsibility for such large-scale political events as, say, the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina or Somalia \_ since the decisions for such events are always made elsewhere. Yet our insight that indeed we are not responsible for the decisions of a Serbian general or a Croatian president tends to mislead us in to thinking that therefore we have no responsibility at all, not even for forming our own judgment, and thus into underrating the responsibility we do have within our own sphere of action. In particular, it seems to absolve us from having to try to see any relation between our own actions and those events, or to recognize the connections between those political decisions and our own personal decisions. It not only shows that we participate in what Beck calls 'organized irresponsibility', upholding the apparent lack of connection between bureaucratically, institutionally, nationally and also individually organized separate competences. It also proves the phenomenal and unquestioned alliance of our personal thinking with the thinking of the major power mongers. For we tend to think that we cannot 'do ' anything , say, about a war, because we deem ourselves to be in the wrong situation; because we are not where the major decisions are made. Which is why many of those not yet entirely disillusioned with politics tend to engage in a form of mental deputy politics, in the style of 'What would I do if I were the general, the prime minister, the president, the foreign minister or the minister of defence?' Since we seem to regard their mega spheres of action as the only worthwhile and truly effective ones, and since our political analyses tend to dwell there first of all, any question of what I would do if I were indeed myself tends to peter out in the comparative insignificance of having what is perceived as 'virtually no possibilities': what I could do seems petty and futile. For my own action I obviously desire the range of action of a general, a prime minister, or a General Secretary of the UN - finding expression in ever more prevalent formulations like ‘I want to stop this war', 'I want military intervention ', 'I want to stop this backlash', or 'I want a moral revolution. '? 'We are this war', however, even if we do not command the troops or participate in so-called peace talks, namely as Drakulic says, in our 'non- comprehension' : our willed refusal to feel responsible for our own thinking and for working out our own understanding, preferring innocently to drift along the ideological current of prefabricated arguments or less than innocently taking advantage of the advantages these offer. And we 'are' the war in our 'unconscious cruelty towards you', our tolerance of the 'fact that you have a yellow form for refugees and I don 't' - our readiness, in other words, to build identities, one for ourselves and one for refugees, one of our own and one for the 'others'. We share in the responsibility for this war and its violence in the way we let them grow inside us, that is, in the way we shape 'our feelings, our relationships, our values' according to the structures and the values of war and violence.

The aff’s identification with the state destroys agency and the value to life—reforming the state without first changing our relationship with it triggers all their harms

**Schaffer 7** (Butler, Prof @ Southwestern U School of Law, Identifying with the State, LewRockwell.com, http://archive.lewrockwell.com/shaffer/shaffer159.html)//LA \*\*\*We don’t endorse ableist language.

One of the deadliest practices we engage in is that of identifying ourselves with a collective entity. Whether it be the state, a nationality, our race or gender, or any other abstraction, we introduce division — hence, conflict — into our lives as we separate ourselves from those who identify with other groupings. If one observes the state of our world today, this is the pattern that underlies our deadly and destructive social behavior. This mindset was no better articulated than when George W. Bush declared “you're either with us, or against us.” Through years of careful conditioning, we learn to think of ourselves in terms of agencies and/or abstractions external to our independent being. Or, to express the point more clearly, we have learned to internalize these external forces; to conform our thinking and behavior to the purposes and interests of such entities. We adorn ourselves with flags, mouth shibboleths, and decorate our cars with bumper-stickers, in order to communicate to others our sense of “who we are.” In such ways does our being become indistinguishable from our chosen collective. In this way are institutions born. We discover a particular form of organization through which we are able to cooperate with others for our mutual benefit. Over time, the advantages derived from this system have a sufficient consistency to lead us to the conclusion that our well-being is dependent upon it. Those who manage the organization find it in their self-interests to propagate this belief so that we will become dependent upon its permanency. Like a sculptor working with clay, institutions take over the direction of our minds, twisting, squeezing, and pounding upon them until we have embraced a mindset conducive to their interests. Once this has been accomplished, we find it easy to subvert our will and sense of purpose to the collective. The organization ceases being a mere tool of mutual convenience, and becomes an end in itself. Our lives become “institutionalized,” and we regard it as fanciful to imagine ourselves living in any other way than as constituent parts of a machine that transcends our individual sense. Once we identify ourselves with the state, that collective entity does more than represent who we are; it is who we are. To the politicized mind, the idea that “we are the government” has real meaning, not in the sense of being able to control such an agency, but in the psychological sense. The successes and failures of the state become the subject's successes and failures; insults or other attacks upon their abstract sense of being — such as the burning of “their” flag — become assaults upon their very personhood. Shortcomings on the part of the state become our failures of character. This is why so many Americans who have belatedly come to criticize the war against Iraq are inclined to treat it as only a “mistake” or the product of “mismanagement,” not as a moral wrong. Our egos can more easily admit to the making of a mistake than to moral transgressions. Such an attitude also helps to explain why, as Milton Mayer wrote in his revealing post-World War II book, They Thought They Were Free, most Germans were unable to admit that the Nazi regime had been tyrannical. It is this dynamic that makes it easy for political officials to generate wars, a process that reinforces the sense of identity and attachment people have for “their” state. It also helps to explain why most Americans — though tiring of the war against Iraq — refuse to condemn government leaders for the lies, forgeries, and deceit employed to get the war started: to acknowledge the dishonesty of the system through which they identify themselves is to admit to the dishonest base of their being. The truthfulness of the state's rationale for war is irrelevant to most of its subjects. It is sufficient that they believe the abstraction with which their lives are intertwined will be benefited in some way by war. Against whom and upon what claim does not matter — except as a factor in assessing the likelihood of success. That most Americans have pipped nary a squeak of protest over Bush administration plans to attack Iran — with nuclear weapons if deemed useful to its ends — reflects the point I am making. Bush could undertake a full-fledged war against Lapland, and most Americans would trot out their flags and bumper-stickers of approval. The “rightness” or “wrongness” of any form of collective behavior becomes interpreted by the standard of whose actions are being considered. During World War II, for example, Japanese kamikaze pilots were regarded as crazed fanatics for crashing their planes into American battleships. At the same time, American war movies (see, e.g., Flying Tigers) extolled the heroism of American pilots who did the same thing. One sees this same double-standard in responding to “conspiracy theories.” “Do you think a conspiracy was behind the 9/11 attacks?” It certainly seems so to me, unless one is prepared to treat the disappearance of the World Trade Center buildings as the consequence of a couple pilots having bad navigational experiences! The question that should be asked is: whose conspiracy was it? To those whose identities coincide with the state, such a question is easily answered: others conspire, we do not. It is not the symbiotic relationship between war and the expansion of state power, nor the realization of corporate benefits that could not be obtained in a free market, that mobilize the machinery of war. Without most of us standing behind “our” system, and cheering on “our” troops, and defending “our” leaders, none of this would be possible. What would be your likely response if your neighbor prevailed upon you to join him in a violent attack upon a local convenience store, on the grounds that it hired “illegal aliens?” Your sense of identity would not be implicated in his efforts, and you would likely dismiss him as a lunatic. Only when our ego-identities become wrapped up with some institutional abstraction — such as the state — can we be persuaded to invest our lives and the lives of our children in the collective madness

of state action. We do not have such attitudes toward organizations with which we have more transitory relationships. If we find an accounting error in our bank statement, we would not find satisfaction in the proposition “the First National Bank, right or wrong.” Neither would we be inclined to wear a T-shirt that read “Disneyland: love it or leave it.” One of the many adverse consequences of identifying with and attaching ourselves to collective abstractions is our loss of control over not only the meaning and direction in our lives, but of the manner in which we can be efficacious in our efforts to pursue the purposes that have become central to us. We become dependent upon the performance of “our” group; “our” reputation rises or falls on the basis of what institutional leaders do or fail to do. If “our” nation-state loses respect in the world — such as by the use of torture or killing innocent people - we consider ourselves no longer respectable, and scurry to find plausible excuses to redeem our egos. When these expectations are not met, we go in search of new leaders or organizational reforms we believe will restore our sense of purpose and pride that we have allowed abstract entities to personify for us. As the costs and failures of the state become increasingly evident, there is a growing tendency to blame this system. But to do so is to continue playing the same game into which we have allowed ourselves to become conditioned. One of the practices employed by the state to get us to mobilize our “dark side” energies in opposition to the endless recycling of enemies it has chosen for us, is that of psychological projection. Whether we care to acknowledge it or not — and most of us do not — each of us has an unconscious capacity for attitudes or conduct that our conscious minds reject. We fear that, sufficiently provoked, we might engage in violence — even deadly — against others; or that inducements might cause us to become dishonest. We might harbor racist or other bigoted sentiments, or consider ourselves lazy or irresponsible. Though we are unlikely to act upon such inner fears, their presence within us can generate discomforting self-directed feelings of guilt, anger, or unworthiness that we would like to eliminate. The most common way in which humanity has tried to bring about such an exorcism is by subconsciously projecting these traits onto others (i.e., “scapegoats”) and punishing them for what are really our own shortcomings. The state has trained us to behave this way, in order that we may be counted upon to invest our lives, resources, and other energies in pursuit of the enemy du jour. It is somewhat ironic, therefore, that most of us resort to the same practice in our criticism of political systems. After years of mouthing the high-school civics class mantra about the necessity for government — and the bigger the government the better — we begin to experience the unexpected consequences of politicization. Tax burdens continue to escalate; or the state takes our home to make way for a proposed shopping center; or ever-more details of our lives are micromanaged by ever-burgeoning state bureaucracies. Having grown weary of the costs — including the loss of control over our lives — we blame the state for what has befallen us. We condemn the Bush administration for the parade of lies that precipitated the war against Iraq, rather than indicting ourselves for ever believing anything the state tells us. We fault the politicians for the skyrocketing costs of governmental programs, conveniently ignoring our insistence upon this or that benefit whose costs we would prefer having others pay. The statists have helped us accept a world view that conflates our incompetence to manage our own lives with their omniscience to manage the lives of billions of people — along with the planet upon which we live! — and we are now experiencing the costs generated by our own gullibility. We have acted like country bumpkins at the state fair with the egg money who, having been fleeced by a bunch of carnival sharpies, look everywhere for someone to blame other than ourselves. We have been euchred out of our very lives because of our eagerness to believe that benefits can be enjoyed without incurring costs; that the freedom to control one's life can be separated from the responsibilities for one's actions; and that two plus two does not have to add up to four if a sizeable public opinion can be amassed against the proposition. By identifying ourselves with any abstraction (such as the state) we give up the integrated life, the sense of wholeness that can be found only within each of us. While the state has manipulated, cajoled, and threatened us to identify ourselves with it, the responsibility for our acceding to its pressures lies within each of us. The statists have — as was their vicious purpose — simply taken over the territory we have abandoned. Our politico-centric pain and suffering has been brought about by our having allowed external forces to move in and occupy the vacuum we created at the center of our being. The only way out of our dilemma involves a retracing of the route that brought us to where we are. We require nothing so much right now as the development of a sense of “who we are” that transcends our institutionalized identities, and returns us – without division and conflict – to a centered, self-directed integrity in our lives.

### AT: Perm

**The permutation engages security through a political telos – blocks off critique**

**Burke 7** (Anthony, lecturer at Adelaide University School of History and Politics, Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence, p. 3-4)

These frameworks are interrogated at the level both of their theoretical conceptualisation and their practice: in their influence and implementation in specific policy contexts and conflicts in East and Central Asia, the Middle East and the 'war on terror', where their meaning and impact take on greater clarity. This approach is based on a conviction that the meaning of powerful political concepts cannot be abstract or easily universalised: they all have histories, often complex and conflictual; their forms and meanings change over time; and they are developed, refined and deployed in concrete struggles over power, wealth and societal form. While this should not preclude normative debate over how political or ethical concepts should be defined and used, and thus be beneficial or destructive to humanity, it embodies a caution that the meaning of concepts can never be stabilised or unproblematic in practice. Their normative potential must always be considered in relation to their utilisation in systems of political, social and economic power and their consequent worldly effects. Hence this book embodies a caution by Michel Foucault, who warned us about the 'politics of truth . . the battle about the status of truth and the economic and political role it plays', and it is inspired by his call to 'detach the power of truth from the forms of hegemony, social, economic and cultural, within which it operates at the present time'.1 It is clear that traditionally coercive and violent approaches to security and strategy are both still culturally dominant, and politically and ethically suspect. However, the reasons for pursuing a critical analysis relate not only to the most destructive or controversial approaches, such as the war in Iraq, but also to their available (and generally preferable) alternatives. There is a necessity to question not merely extremist versions such as the Bush doctrine, Indonesian militarism or Israeli expansionism, but also their mainstream critiques - whether they take the form of liberal policy approaches in international relations (IR), just war theory, US realism, optimistic accounts of globalisation, rhetorics of sensitivity to cultural difference, or centrist Israeli security discourses based on territorial compromise with the Palestinians. The surface appearance of lively (and often significant) debate masks a deeper agreement about major concepts, forms of political identity and the imperative to secure them. Debates about when and how it may be effective and legitimate to use military force in tandem with other policy options, for example, mask a more fundamental discursive consensus about the meaning of security, the effectiveness of strategic power, the nature of progress, the value of freedom or the promises of national and cultural identity. As a result, political and intellectual debate about insecurity, violent conflict and global injustice can become hostage to a claustrophic structure of political and ethical possibility that systematically wards off critique.

### Link

**Terror discourse is self fulfilling**

**Zulaika, 10** (Joseba, Center for Basque Studies, University of Nevada, “The terror/counterterror edge: when non-terror becomes a terrorism problem and real terror cannot be detected by counterterrorism,” Critical Studies on Terrorism, Vol. 3, No. 2, August 2010, pg. 247-260, Taylor and Francis, pdf­)

In fact, between 1974 and 1994, two decades in which terrorism loomed as the greatest threat to American security, more people died in the United States of bee stings; and John Mueller has shown the extent to which the dangers of terrorism have been ‘overblown’ (Mueller 2006). Consider the four years 1989–1992 to realise the magnitude of the non-Terror problem afflicting the United States. These were the years in which communism as the historic enemy of the West disappeared and terrorism was called to substitute for it. And yet, contrary to Brian Jenkins’s prediction that by the end of the 1980s terrorism incidents might double, during those four years there was not a single fatality from terrorism in the United States. During those same years there were approximately 100,000 reported ‘normal’ deaths. In the same period over 1500 books on terrorism were published. It is not a joke to say that the real problem for this entire terrorism industry was the very absence of terrorism. The very logic of ‘anomaly’ requires that some exceptional event takes place, so that at last one ‘terrorist’ death will make a thousand other deaths ‘ordinary’. But if the ratio is, as it was during those four years, 100,000 versus zero, then the very non-existence of the anomalous puts in question the normality/abnormality polarity and deprives the entire terrorism discourse of its basic frame. What do you do in such situations? If there is no problem but there is supposed to be one, consciously or unconsciously you end up helping create one. This is the very definition of the self-fulfilling prophecy. As sociologist Robert Merton puts it: The self-fulfilling prophecy is, in the beginning, a false definition of the situation evoking a new behavior which makes the original false conception come true. This specious validity of the self-fulfilling prophecy perpetuates a reign of terror. For the prophet will cite the actual course of events as proof that he was right from the very beginning . . . such are the perversities of social logic. (Merton 1968, p. 477) It was false that al-Qaeda was in Iraq before March 2003 (the excuse to go to war) but it is true that there is al-Qaeda in Iraq now – which serves as a justification to continue the war. It was false that there was a minaret problem in Switzerland (the excuse for an antiMuslim referendum) but it is true that there is a minaret problem in Switzerland now. A similar affliction appears to be taking over in other regions of the European Union. Countries such as Finland, as an example, are so peripheral to the hot spots of the current international politics that there has never been a terrorist act, let alone a terrorist organisation, in their soil. When Terror is the tabooed coin of political centrality, a country with no Terror problem appears to be a second-class power deprived of symbolic capital. Such non-existence borders on the anomalous. It is no surprise therefore that Finland, under obligation from the European Union and international treaties, has decided to enact antiterrorist legislation. It is one thing not to be a nuclear power, a prerogative that requires enormous economic and political might, and which is the ultimate symbol of military power; but in the absence of nuclear power, what else but involvement in counterterrorism (always symbiotically related to nuclearism in the current world) holds enough symbolic capital as to guarantee that a country is not totally irrelevant in current world affairs? So, even if there is no threat of terrorism and this is the last thing the authorities want to plague their country, the dynamics of international politics subject to the ‘War on Terror’ and the omnipresence of the apocalyptic messages of terror spread by the media make it inevitable the development of a tough counterterrorist legislation (with the likelihood that previously non-terrorist acts will now be categorised as ‘terrorist’) and the involvement in a dominant public discourse in which everyone is affected by the threat from terrorism. It appears to be partly a case of terrorism envy. I remember Basque friends of mine being affected by this malady in their youths: anyone worth his salt should have been in ETA during the anti-Francoist resistance of the 1960s and early 1970s. If you were not, you suffered from a clear case of symbolic castration. Involvement in ETA was the way to show that you had what it took. And in order to be considered by ETA a worthy candidate, you had to do something daring, such as putting at risk the life of an alleged police informer by provoking a car accident, hoping in the meantime that this would be rewarded with membership in the group. When ETA had all the symbolic capital of heroic resistance, you felt guilty for not participating in its violent activity and envious of those who enjoyed its mystique. Something similar seems to take place with nations regarding international terrorism. Was not the good luck of Prime Minister Jose María Aznar that he had a puny domestic terrorist group, killing a town councilman or a journalist once in a while, against which he could involve his entire nation; and as a reward for which he could suddenly turn Spain, after centuries of political and military irrelevance on the world stage, and as illustrated by the photograph of the Azores before the Iraqi war, into a power player on the international scene in the company of President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair? Which second- or third-rate country would not feel political envy when seeing such influence in exchange for three or four terrorist fatalities a year? Playing terrorist Begona Aretxaga views the response of the Spanish state terror to ETA’s terrorism as the result of mimetic terrorist desire, namely, ‘an organized mimesis of terrorism as the constituting force of the state as subject’ (Aretxaga 2005, p. 223). In essence, in order to vanquish Basque terrorism, state officials became terrorists and organised a state terrorist organisation by the name of Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberacíon (GAL, Antiterrorist Liberation Groups). Aretxaga shows how the Spanish agents’ involvement in the killing of Basque refugees reads like: a parody of stock representations of Basque terrorists. It imitates the landscape and actions associated with ETA in cinema, fiction, and the media. . . . What is produced in this mimetic engagement of the state with the representation of terrorism is, precisely, terror: a traumatic read of dead bodies and intense affects – exhilaration, anger, and fear. And not only terror, but the state itself as subject, is produced in the act of producing terror – a restless state subject characterized by uncontrolled excitement. (Aretxaga 2005, pp. 223–224) One of the kidnappings by the Spanish officials was that of a French citizen by the name of Segundo Marey; soon they found out that he had no connection with ETA at all; still, instead of admitting the mistake and letting the man free, the Chief of Police consulted with the Civil Governor and the Head of Intelligence and decided to keep Marey kidnapped in order to exploit him politically against the French state. They issued a communiqué asking the French authorities to release two Spanish policemen detained in France for an attempted kidnapping or Marey would be killed. There was talk among the officers about killing the man, but luckily France released the Spanish policemen and Marey was also freed. This was a clear case in which state officials were ‘playing terrorist’ (they even decided to organise an extortion system similar to ETA’s that involved kidnapping French industrialists and levying a ‘revolutionary tax’). In the process, they ‘got carried away by the excitement of transgression and the sensation of omnipotence it brings’ (Aretxaga 2005, p. 221). By then, Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez had famously justified the state’s counterterrorist dirty war as the need for ‘the sewers of the State’. The state terror went on for four years and resulted in the killings of 27 refugees. It is a case of terrorism envy in which what counts for state officials is not the legality of freeing an innocent man, but instead, observes Aretxaga (2005): what matters is the power emanating from mimetic action, the enactment of the desire to be a terrorist. It is the act of kidnapping, killing, extorting that makes terrorism – like the state – real and effective, by binding its actors to and in an imaginary relation that constitutes an alternative reality. On the stage of the state being, fantasy cannot be separated from the calculated objectives that originally triggered the actions of terror. Indeed, it is through the enactment of fantasy in mimetic performance that terror becomes real and the state powerful. (p. 224) Could not we say similar things about the open adoption of torture by Bush’s administration? If terrorists can kidnap, torture and kill, then why not our powerful state? Regardless of the well-recognised fact that it does not bring forth reliable truth, torture is the ultimate transgressive act of power. Mirror images inside terrorists: from McVeigh to Major Hasan What about the terrorism envy of those who, according to media representations, became paradigmatic ‘terrorists’ such as the Unabomber, Timothy McVeigh, or most recently Major Nidal Hasan? In the case of Basque friends of mine who suffered ETA envy, it was an armed organisation that had to recruit them after weighing up whether they were suitable material for an underground organisation; I know of several who were rejected despite their ‘actions’ to prove their worth. But in the current media frenzy, anyone can instantly become a ‘terrorist’ regardless of being part of an armed group or having a stated strategy. This is the case of McVeigh whose acts did not fit any classical definition of an armed terrorism group engaged in psychological terror with a political agenda. What is remarkable about McVeigh is the self-fulfilling nature of his terrorist career, because the basic references of his plot were provided by counterterrorism discourse: his shooting practice targets while a soldier were ‘terrorists’; his action plan was scripted by William Luther Pierce’s (under the pseudonym Andrew Macdonald) right-wing The Turner Diaries (1978) (itself inspired by the anonymous apocalyptic novel The John Franklin Letters (1959) in which America falls under a global Soviet conspiracy); his alias was ‘T. Tutle’, the name of the superterrorist hero in the Hollywood film Brazil (1985); and the day chosen for the bombing was 19 April, the second anniversary of the Waco tragedy, a cause célèbre for militias angered by the government’s violent response to the apocalyptic Branch Davidians. So the question is: after his rejection by the army, where he wanted to serve as a marine, to what extent was a dejected McVeigh’s desire for violent action prompted out of spite and following the very counterterrorism agenda he had pursued earlier in his army career? In McVeigh’s subjectivity the terrorist and the marine soldier had an imaginary relationship in which they constituted each other as in a Lacanian ‘mirror image’. What makes a soldier a soldier in counterterrorist warfare is his deadly opposition to the figure of the terrorist; similarly, even if ordinarily the aspiration of the terrorists is not to fight soldiers, in an allout war in which the enemy is defined as ‘terrorist’, what makes him or her a terrorist is the determination to fight the soldier to the end. McVeigh felt the power by which his own self could experience both sides of his divided self, the soldier and the terrorist, by switching from one side of the imaginary mirror to the other; and his omnipotence consisted in demonstrating to the American public that he was the subject who could be the edge bringing both irreconcilable sides of the mirror together. Since he was not allowed to be the marine counterterrorist hero, he could instead be its arch-enemy by enviously appropriating for himself the power of the tabooed Terrorist. And what about Major Hasan and the Fort Hood massacre? Was it a case of insanity or terrorism? He seems to be a Muslim fanatic, connected to other Muslim fanatics. Is he a terrorist? Does he have an organisation behind him ready to use terror to further a political agenda? Or is he someone who, in a case of terrorism envy, translated his psychotic confusion, pushing him over the edge into the fantasy of becoming a ‘martyr’ for his Muslim brothers? He must have seen himself in the mirror of his split American and Muslim personae. Should he be on the side of his own American army killing Muslims in Iraq and Afghanistan, or should he be squarely on the side of the Muslims and therefore against his own army? When he could no longer harbour inside the split between both phantasmatic realities constituting each other, he decided to overcome the unbearable by turning himself into a martyr in the name of Allah. As Robert Wright wrote in an op-ed piece: The Fort Hood shooting, then, is an example of Islamist terrorism being spread partly by the war on terrorism – or, actually, by two wars on terrorism, in Iraq and Afghanistan. And Fort Hood is the biggest data point we have – the most lethal Islamist terrorist attack on American soil since 9/11. It’s only one piece of evidence, but it’s a salient piece, and it supports the liberal, not the conservative, war-on-terrorism paradigm. (Wright 2009, p. W11) Conservatives may argue that we cannot allow people like Hasan veto power over our foreign policy, but the reality is that alienated, vulnerable people like him are likely to end up going over the edge because of the hawkish anti-jihad War on Terror that led to disasters such as the Iraq war. Is such a never-ending war necessary when, in the era of the Internet, terrorist acts can be orchestrated from anywhere, including a US military barracks such as Fort Hood? In Wright’s opinion, ‘the case of Nidal Hasan shows one thing for sure: Homegrown American terrorists don’t need a safe haven. All they need is a place to buy a gun’ (Wright 2009, p. W11). Still, Hasan is, out of the millions of American Muslims, the only one to have committed such a horrific massacre in the eight years since 9/11, which shows that Muslims are not intrinsically any more violent than Christians. But when, in the era of the Internet and video technology, you have instances such as minaret bans in Switzerland and denigration of Muslims in the workplace, the likelihood of vulnerable people going overboard increases dangerously. There was also the case of Carlos Bledsoe, converted to Islam as a teenager, who fatally shot a soldier in Little Rock who, upon being arrested, told the police about Muslims being killed in Iraq and Afghanistan. To what extent is all of this a case of self-fulfilling prophecy? On 4 December 2009, at New York’s Binghamton University, a Saudi Arabian student stabbed to death an emeritus 77-year-old professor who had been a member of his dissertation committee. One of the student’s roommates declared that, before the murder, the Muslim graduate student ‘was acting oddly, like a terrorist’ (Schmidt and Regan 2009, p. A23). Is there now any way in which the actions of a Muslim who goes mad in the United States would not be translated into ‘terrorism?’ And then, on 11 December 2009, there were reports that five young Muslim Americans from the suburbs of Washington had been arrested in Pakistan on their way to Taliban territory. The men’s intention was apparently to fight American troops in Afghanistan; reportedly, they had been recruited by a Pakistani militant through an Internet chat room: It was unclear on Thursday how serious a threat the group presented, or whether these young men had broken any laws in Pakistan of the United States. At least two of the men were being questioned in F.B.I. custody in Pakistan, and all of them would probably be deported, a senior administration official in Washington said. Whether the men acted on a lark or were recruited as part of a larger militant outfit, the case has renewed concerns that American citizens, some with ethnic ties to Pakistan and other Muslim countries, are increasingly at the centre of terrorist plots against the United States and other nations. (Giliani and Perlez, 2009, p. A20) Below the report there was another piece about the suspected men being praised by their neighbours as ‘intensely devout “good guys”’ (Lorber and Southhall 2009, p. A20). If they had been recruited by ‘a militant with links to al Qaeda’, once in Pakistan the five men were stranded. They tried to join ‘an extremist Islamic school’ near Karachi and an ‘extremist organisation’, but were ‘rebuffed in both places because of their Western demeanor and their inability to speak the national language, Urdu’. The five men had been arrested at a home in a government housing complex that belonged to an uncle of the eldest of the group. The picture of five American citizens recruited allegedly by al-Qaeda through the Internet and unable to join an extremist group once in Pakistan does not underscore a very efficient terrorist organisation; still, the journalists wondered ‘whether the men had been recruited to a specific militant or terrorist organization’ and mentioned the possibility of ties to banned groups such as Jaish-e-Muhammad and Jamaat-ud-Dawa. What the report did not disclose was the mystery of who the Pakistani close to al-Qaeda was who recruited them with promises of taking them ‘to Afghanistan to fight jihad’, and who ‘booked them in a hotel in Lahore’, but ‘once they got there, their contact went to ground and they were stranded’. In the end, were the five Muslim Americans caught in the ‘mirror image’ inside their split identities, by which their religious self and their civic citizenship are constituted in irreconcilable mutual antagonism? Such a mirror split, needless to say, is linked directly to the policies and mind-set of the War on Terror turned into the self-fulfilling soil in which Muslim Americans are pushed towards the edge. A week after the news of the five young men caught in Pakistan broke, another report delineated the larger contexts of Muslim anger in the United States and a clear picture, once again, of how counterterrorism may become terrorism’s best ally.

### AT: Policy Good

Refusal to address the epistemological assumptions of the affirmative dooms their project to serial policy failure

Dillon and Reid 2000 (Michael, Professor of Politics – University of Lancaster, and Julian, Lecturer in International Relations – King’s College, “Global Governance, Liberal Peace, and Complex Emergency”, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, January / March, 25(1))

More specifically, where there is a policy problematic there is expertise, and where there is expertise there, too, a policy problematic will emerge. Such problematics are detailed and elaborated in terms of discrete forms of knowledge as well as interlocking policy domains. Policy domains reify the problematization of life in certain ways by turning these epistemically and politically contestable orderings of life into "problems" that require the continuous attention of policy science and the continuous resolutions of policymakers. Policy "actors" develop and compete on the basis of the expertise that grows up around such problems or clusters of problems and their client populations. Here, too, we may also discover what might be called "epistemic entrepreneurs." Albeit the market for discourse is prescribed and policed in ways that Foucault indicated, bidding to formulate novel problematizations they seek to "sell" these, or otherwise have them officially adopted. In principle, there is no limit to the ways in which the management of population may be problematized. All aspects of human conduct, any encounter with life, is problematizable. Any problematization is capable of becoming a policy problem. Governmentality thereby creates a market for policy, for science and for policy science, in which problematizations go looking for policy sponsors while policy sponsors fiercely compete on behalf of their favored problematizations. Reproblematization of problems is constrained by the institutional and ideological investments surrounding accepted "problems," and by the sheer difficulty of challenging the inescapable ontological and epistemological assumptions that go into their very formation. There is nothing so fiercely contested as an epistemological or ontological assumption. And there is nothing so fiercely ridiculed as the suggestion that the real problem with problematizations exists precisely at the level of such assumptions. Such "paralysis of analysis" is precisely what policymakers seek to avoid since they are compelled constantly to respond to circumstances over which they ordinarily have in fact both more and less control than they proclaim. What they do not have is precisely the control that they want. Yet serial policy failure--the fate and the fuel of all policy--compels them into a continuous search for the new analysis that will extract them from the aporias in which they constantly find themselves enmeshed.[ 35] Serial policy failure is no simple shortcoming that science and policy--and policy science--will ultimately overcome. Serial policy failure is rooted in the ontological and epistemological assumptions that fashion the ways in which global governance encounters and problematizes life as a process of emergence through fitness landscapes that constantly adaptive and changing ensembles have continuously to negotiate. As a particular kind of intervention into life, global governance promotes the very changes and unintended outcomes that it then serially reproblematizes in terms of policy failure. Thus, global liberal governance is not a linear problem-solving process committed to the resolution of objective policy problems simply by bringing better information and knowledge to bear upon them. A nonlinear economy of power/knowledge, it deliberately installs socially specific and radically inequitable distributions of wealth, opportunity, and mortal danger both locally and globally through the very detailed ways in which life is variously (policy) problematized by it.

## 1NR

### No Nuke Terror

**Even if any single step is possible, terrorists have to succeed at every step – it’s statistically impossible**

**Mueller 9** - John Mueller, Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies, Mershon Center  
Professor of Political Science30 April 2009 “THE ATOMIC TERRORIST?” <http://www.icnnd.org/research/Mueller_Terrorism.pdf>

In an article on the prospects for atomic terrorism, Bill Keller of *The New York Times* suggests that “the best reason for thinking it won’t happen is that it hasn’t happened yet,” and that, he worries, “is terrible logic.”33 However, “logic” aside, there is another quite good reason for thinking it won’t happen: the task is incredibly difficult. I have arrayed a lengthy set of obstacles confronting the would-be atomic terrorist. Those who warn about the likelihood of a terrorist bomb contend that a terrorist group could, if often with great difficulty, surmount each obstacle—that doing so in each case is “not impossible.”34 But it is vital to point out that, while it may be “not impossible” to surmount each individual step, the likelihood that a group could surmount a series of them quickly becomes vanishingly small. Even the very alarmed Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier contend that the atomic terrorists’ task “would clearly be among the most difficult types of attack to carry out” or “one of the most difficult missions a terrorist group could hope to try.” But, stresses the CIA’s George Tenet, a terrorist atomic bomb is “possible” or “not beyond the realm of possibility.”35 Accordingly, it might be useful to take a stab at estimating just how “difficult” the atomic terrorists’ task, in aggregate, is—that is, how far from the fringe of the “realm of possibility” it might be. Most discussions of atomic terrorism deal in a rather piecemeal fashion with the subject--focusing separately on individual tasks such as procuring HEU or assembling a device or transporting it. However, as the Gilmore Commission, a special advisory panel to the President and Congress, stresses, setting off a nuclear device capable of producing mass destruction presents not only “Herculean challenges,” but it requires that a whole series of steps be accomplished: obtaining enough fissile material, designing a weapon “that will bring that mass together in a tiny fraction of a second,” and figuring out some way to deliver the thing. And it emphasizes that these merely constitute “the minimum requirements.” If each is not fully met, the result is not simply a less powerful weapon, but one that can’t produce any significant nuclear yield at all or can’t be delivered.36 Following this perspective, an approach that seems appropriate is to catalogue the barriers that must be overcome by a terrorist group in order to carry out the task of producing, transporting, and then successfully detonating an improvised nuclear device. Table 1 attempts to do this, and it arrays some 20 of these—*all* of which must be surmounted by the atomic aspirant. Actually, it would be quite possible to come up with a longer list: in the interests of keeping the catalogue of hurdles down to a reasonable number, some of the entries are actually collections of tasks and could be divided into two or three or more. For example, number 5 on the list requires that heisted highly-enriched uranium be neither a scam nor part of a sting nor of inadequate quality due to insider incompetence; but this hurdle could as readily be rendered as three separate ones. In contemplating the task before them, would-be atomic terrorists effectively *must* go though a exercise that looks much like this. If and when they do so, they are likely to find their prospects daunting and accordingly uninspiring or even terminally dispiriting. Assigning and calculating probabilities The discussion thus far has followed a qualitative approach: synthesizing a considerable amount of material to lay out the route a terrorist group must take to acquire and detonate an atomic bomb in the most likely scenario. It seems to me that this exercise by itself suggests the almost breathtaking enormity of the difficulties facing the would-be atomic terrorist. This conclusion can be reinforced by a quantitative assessment. Assigning a probability that terrorists will be able to overcome each barrier is, of course, a tricky business, and any such exercise should be regarded as rather tentative and exploratory, or perhaps simply as illustrative—though it is done all the time in cost/benefit analysis. One might begin a quantitative approach by adopting probability estimates that purposely, and heavily, bias the case in the terrorists’ favor. In my view, this would take place if it is assumed that the terrorists have a fighting chance of 50 percent of overcoming each of the 20 obstacles displayed in Table 1, though for many barriers, probably almost all, the odds against them are surely much worse than that. Even with that generous bias, the chances that a concerted effort would be successful comes out to be less than one in a million, specifically 1,048,576. If one assumes, somewhat more realistically, that their chances at each barrier are one in three, the cumulative odds they will be able to pull off the deed drop to one in well over three billion—specifically 3,486,784,401. What they would be at the (still entirely realistic) level of one in ten boggles the mind. Moreover, all this focuses on the effort to deliver a single bomb. If the requirement were to deliver several, the odds become, of course, even more prohibitive.

**Our statistics are for the most plausible scenarios-anything else is even less likely.**

Mueller 8, John, Prof. Pol. Sci. @ Ohio State, 1/1/ (<http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/APSACHGO.PDF>)

These odds are for the most plausible scenario by means of which a terrorist group might gain a bomb: constructing one from HEU obtained through illicit means. As noted, there are other routes to a bomb: stealing a fully constructed one (or the HEU needed to make one) or being given one as a gift by a nuclear state. However, as also noted, those routes are generally conceded, even by most alarmists, to be considerably less likely than the one outlined in Table 1 to be successful for the terrorists. Additionally, if there were a large number of concerted efforts, policing and protecting would presumably become easier because the aspirants would be exposing themselves repeatedly and would likely be stepping all over each other in their quest to access the right stuff. Also, the difficulties for the atomic terrorists are likely to increaseover time because of much enhanced protective and policing efforts by self-interested governments--there is considerable agreement, for example, that Russian nuclear materials are much more adequately secured than they were ten or fifteen years ago (Pluta and Zimmerman 2006, 257). Moreover, all this focuses on the effort to deliver a single bomb. If the requirement were to deliver several, the odds become, of course, even more prohibitive.

Terrorists aren’t pursuing nukes

Wolfe 12 – Alan Wolfe is Professor of Political Science at Boston College. He is also a Senior Fellow with the World Policy Institute at the New School University in New York. A contributing editor of The New Republic, The Wilson Quarterly, Commonwealth Magazine, and In Character, Professor Wolfe writes often for those publications as well as for Commonweal, The New York Times, Harper's, The Atlantic Monthly, The Washington Post, and other magazines and newspapers. March 27, 2012, "Fixated by “Nuclear Terror” or Just Paranoia?" [http://www.hlswatch.com/2012/03/27/fixated-by-“nuclear-terror”-or-just-paranoia-2/](http://www.hlswatch.com/2012/03/27/fixated-by-)

If one were to read the most recent unclassified report to Congress on the acquisition of technology relating to weapons of mass destruction and advanced conventional munitions, it does have a section on CBRN terrorism (note, not WMD terrorism). The intelligence community has a very toned down statement that says “several terrorist groups … probably remain interested in [CBRN] capabilities, but not necessarily in all four of those capabilities. … mostly focusing on low-level chemicals and toxins.” They’re talking about terrorists getting industrial chemicals and making ricin toxin, not nuclear weapons. And yes, Ms. Squassoni, it is primarily al Qaeda that the U.S. government worries about, no one else. The trend of worldwide terrorism continues to remain in the realm of conventional attacks. In 2010, there were more than 11,500 terrorist attacks, affecting about 50,000 victims including almost 13,200 deaths. None of them were caused by CBRN hazards. Of the 11,000 terrorist attacks in 2009, none were caused by CBRN hazards. Of the 11,800 terrorist attacks in 2008, none were caused by CBRN hazards.

### Predictions

**Prediction is impossible – linear analysis causes policy failure**

**Sa, 04** – Deug Whan, Dong-U College, South Korea, (“CHAOS, UNCERTA I N T Y, AND POLICY CHOICE: UTILIZING THE ADAPTIVE MODEL,” International Review of Public Administration, vol. 8, no. 2, 2004, scholar)RK

In many cases, a small choice might lead to overwhelming results that generate either a virtuous cycle or a vicious cycle. If future results can be clearly predicted by stability and linearity, this will eliminate difficulties in making choice. Policy choice has been an embarrassment in uncertain or chaotic situations that do not meet desirable conditions. As a result, most major policies revert back to the uncertainty and chaos. Though the presence of uncertainty in policy procedures is widely known, it has not been determined what influence it wields on policy choice (Morgan and Henruion 1990: Lein 1997: 20). Generally, uncertainty refers to ‘difficulties in predicting the future.’ Naturally, the uncertainty here includes not simply difficulties in predicting the results of various factors and interactions, but also difficulties in predicting different configurations of interactions caused by the effect of such interactions (Saperstein 1997: 103-107). Uncertainty is classified into 3 categories according to source and phase of policy procedures; i) uncertainty from contingency, ii) uncertainty from inter-dependency of constituents, and iii) general uncertainty (Tompson 1967). The uncertainty from contingency arises when it is impossible to predict how the policy environment will change. What results is uncertainty from the interdependency of constituents makes it impossible to predict changes in the relationship between policy matters and constituents. Finally, general uncertainty comes from lack of knowledge about the cause and effect relationship in policy making. The Emergence of Chaos Theory and Characteristics Chaos theory offers theoretical explanations about the world of uncertainty. Chaos theory refers to the study of complex and dynamic systems with orders and patterns emerging from externally chaotic forms (Prigogine and Strengers 1984). The reason chaos theory draws a lot of interest is the highlight of; disorder, instability, diversity, flexibility and disequilibrium. This explains characteristics of rapid social changes in modern times referred to as the age of uncertainty. The focus of the chaos theory as a study is on complex, indeterminate, non-linear and dynamic systems. The main study object chaotic systems are chaotic which are complicated and dynamic. The characteristics of the chaos theory are as follows: The first is its self-organization principle. Selforganization means that the organization is determined by internal factors without any outer interference. That is to say, self-organization is a network of production processes of constituents interrelated with each other, and a system that produces the same network (Varela Maturana and Urife 1974; Jantsch 1980). The chaos theory assumes that order and organization can make an autogenesis out of disorder and chaos through the process of ‘self-organization.’ This also means that setting up conditions for self-organization to naturally take place can result in a reduction of policy failures. The second characteristic is co-evolution, referring to a process in which individual entities constituting a system continually adapt to each other and change. The essential concept of co-evolution, is ‘mutual causality,’ which puts emphasis on mutual evolution where an individual entity evolves entire group and vice versa, not the evolution of the survival of the fittest. It means interdependent species in continual inter-relationships evolve together. For example, if a mutant frog appears with a longer tongue or a frog whose hunting speed is twice as fast, it will have a competitive advantage to the environment and subsequent off-spring will flourish with the superior gene. On the other hand, flies will decrease in number, until a mutant fly appears that has any combination of advantages such as; faster, bad smells frogs avoid, or becomes poisonous, subsequent off-spring will survive and flourish. This is the way frogs and flies coevolve with each other. Therefore, chaos theory regards a variety of paradoxes as an important principle instead of ignoring it or taking it as an exception. Third, the characteristic is the existing Newtonian determinism theory which presumes linear relations where things proceed from the starting point toward the future on the thread of a single orbit. Thus, it also assumes that predictions of the future are on the extended line of present knowledge and future knowledge is not as unclear as the present one (Saperstein 1997: 103107), and that as similar inputs generate similar outcomes, there will be no big differences despite small changes in initial conditions. However, chaos theory assumes that the outcome is larger than the input and that prediction of the future is fundamentally impossible.3 Hence, due to extreme sensitivity to initial fluctuations and non-linear feedback loops, small differences in initial conditions are subject to amplifications and eventual different outcomes, known as ‘chaos.’4 Chaos is sometimes divided into strong chaos and weak chaos (Eve, Horsfall and Lee 1997: 106); and goes through a series of orbit processes of close intersections and divisions. In particular, weak chaos is found in the limits that account for the small proportion inside a system, while strong chaos features divisions at some points inside a system, which lead to occupation of the entire system in little time. CHAOS, UNCERTAINTY AND POLICY CHOICE 1. Review of Existing Policy Models Social scientists have tried to explain and predict policy matters, but never have generated satisfactory outcomes in terms of accuracy of predictions. There could be a variety of reasons for this inaccuracy in prediction, but one certain reason is that policies themselves are intrinsically governed by uncertainty, complexity and chaos in policies that produce many different outcomes though they are faced with the same initial internal states, the same environments, and governed by the same causal relationships.

### Util

Utilitarian calculability justifies mass atrocity and turns its own end – it’s not inevitable

Weizman 11 (Eyal Weizman, professor of visual and spatial cultures at Goldsmiths, University of London, 2011, “The Least of All Possible Evils: Humanitarian Violence from Arendt to Gaza,” pp 8-10)

The theological origins of the lesser evil argument cast a long shadow on the present. In fact the idiom has become so deeply ingrained, and is invoked in such a staggeringly diverse set of contexts – from individual situational ethics and international relations, to attempts to govern the economics of violence in the context of the ‘war on terror’ and the efforts of human rights and humanitarian activists to manoeuvre through the paradoxes of aid – that it seems to have altogether taken the place previously reserved for the ‘good’. Moreover, the very evocation of the ‘good’ seems to everywhere invoke the utopian tragedies of modernity, in which evil seemed lurking in a horrible manichaeistic inversion. If no hope is offered in the future, all that remains is to insure ourselves against the risks that it poses, to moderate and lessen the collateral effects of necessary acts, and tend to those who have suffered as a result. In relation to the ‘war on terror,’ the terms of the lesser evil were most clearly and prominently articulated by former human rights scholar and leader of Canada’s Liberal Party Michael Ignatieff. In his book *The Lesser Evil*, Ignatieff suggested that in ‘balancing liberty against security’ liberal states establish mechanisms to regulate the breach of some human rights and legal norms, and allow their security services to engage in forms of extrajudicial violence – which he saw as lesser evils – in order to fend off or minimize potential greater evils, such as terror attacks on civilians of western states.11 If governments need to violate rights in a terrorist emergency, this should be done, he thought, only as an exception and according to a process of adversarial scrutiny. ‘Exceptions’, Ignatieff states, ‘do not destroy the rule but save it, provided that they are temporary, publicly justified, and deployed as a last resort.’12 The lesser evil emerges here as a pragmatist compromise, a ‘tolerated sin’ that functions as the very justification for the notion of exception. State violence in this model takes part in a necro-economy in which various types of destructive measure are weighed in a utilitarian fashion, not only in relation to the damage they produce, but to the harm they purportedly prevent and even in relation to the more brutal measures they may help restrain. In this logic, the problem of contemporary state violence resembles indeed an all-too-human version of the mathematical minimum problem of the divine calculations previously mentioned, one tasked with determining the smallest level of violence necessary to avert the greater harm. For the architects of contemporary war this balance is trapped between two poles: keeping violence at a low enough level to limit civilian suffering, and at a level high enough to bring a decisive end to the war and bring peace.13 More recent works by legal scholars and legal advisers to states and militaries have sought to extend the inherent elasticity of the system of legal exception proposed by Ignatieff into ways of rewriting the laws of armed conflict themselves.14 Lesser evil arguments are now used to defend anything from targeted assassinations and mercy killings, house demolitions, deportation, torture,15 to the use of (sometimes) non-lethal chemical weapons, the use of human shields, and even ‘the intentional targeting of some civilians if it could save more innocent lives than they cost.’16 In one of its more macabre moments it was suggested that the atomic bombings of Hiroshima might also be tolerated under the defence of the lesser evil. Faced with a humanitarian A-bomb, one might wonder what, in fact, might come under the definition of a greater evil. Perhaps it is time for the differential accounting of the lesser evil to replace the mechanical bureaucracy of the ‘banality of evil’ as the idiom to describe the most extreme manifestations of violence. Indeed, it is through this use of the lesser evil that societies that see themselves as democratic can maintain regimes of occupation and neo-colonization. Beyond state agents, those practitioners of lesser evils, as this book claims, must also include the members of independent nongovernmental organizations that make up the ecology of contemporary war and crisis zones. The lesser evil is the argument of the humanitarian agent that seeks military permission to provide medicines and aid in places where it is in fact the duty of the occupying military power to do so, thus saving the military limited resources. The lesser evil is often the justification of the military officer who attempts to administer life (and death) in an ‘enlightened’ manner; it is sometimes, too, the brief of the security contractor who introduces new and more efficient weapons and spatio-technological means of domination, and advertises them as ‘humanitarian technology’. In these cases the logic of the lesser evil opens up a thick political field of participation belonging together otherwise opposing fields of action, to the extent that it might obscure the fundamental moral differences between these various groups. But, even according to the terms of an economy of losses and gains, the conception of the lesser evil risks becoming counterproductive: less brutal measures are also those that may be more easily naturalized, accepted and tolerated – and hence more frequently used, with the result that a greater evil may be reached cumulatively, Such observations amongst other paradoxes are unpacked in one of the most powerful challenges to ideas such as Ignatieff’s – Adi Ophir’s philosophical essay *The Order of Evils*. In this book Ophir developed an ethical system that is similarly not grounded in a search for the ‘good’ but the systemic logic of an economy of violence – the possibility of a lesser means and the risk of more damage – but insists that questions of violence are forever unpredictable and will always escape the capacity to calculate them. Inherent in Ophir’s insistence on the necessity of calculating is, he posits, the impossibility of doing so. The demand of his ethics are grounded in this impossibility.17